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Acoustic Separation in Military Justice: Filling the
Decision Rule Vacuum with Ethical Standards
Rachel E. VanLandingham*
Commanders in the US. military justice system wield vast criminal
prosecutorial authority, power largely unconstrained by formal
standards, guiding principles, or training. While extensive regulatory
guidance exists regarding most every other enterprise a military
commander undertakes-from getting dressed to taking a hill-
surprisingly little guides commanders as they decide which service
members to prosecute for which crimes. Civilian federal prosecutors, in
contrast, operate under a rubric of ethical standards, rules, and policy
guidelines that at least channel, if not occasionally limit, their enormous
criminal justice discretion. The absence of military professional
guidelines or standards of conduct regarding command prosecutorial
discretion contributes to the appearance of uneven treatment of sexual
assault and other crimes in the military. This decisional vacuum does a
grave disservice to commanders as they execute their disciplinary duties
without clearly articulated decisional touchstones.
This Article critically examines the lack of formal guidance
regarding commanders' exercise of their prosecutorial discretion. It
first contextualizes the need for such guidance by highlighting the so-
called acoustic separation typically prevalent in criminal justice systems.
Such separation assumes the existence of both societal conduct rules
governing behavior and distinct decision rules for public officials
enforcing the former. Since the requisite normative constraints of
decision rules are largely unarticulated in the military justice system, the
resultant warped acoustic separation allows for the appearance, if not
the occasional reality, of arbitrary and inconsistent results. After
contrasting the Manual for Courts-Martial's decisional rule lacuna with
the various Department of Justice [DoJ] and American Bar Association
guidelines, this Article develops a tailored set of hortatory rules for the
military commander to use when making disciplinary decisions. Such
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hortatory standards of conduct dovetail with the US. military's culture
of ethical professionalism and can help better educate and guide
commanders' prosecutorial and disciplinary decisions, thus reinforcing
the 'justice" component of the military justice system.
INTRODUCTION
A commander in the U.S. military justice system wields much authority.,
Instead of a district attorney choosing which charges to file against which
individuals in his or her jurisdiction, the power to prosecute in the military resides
with non-lawyer unit commanders. 2 He or she is given the independent authority
to dispose of criminal charges in a variety of ways, including dismissal of
accusations or in the alternative, by convening a court-martial (criminal trial) to
prosecute the individual.3  Commanders also possess wide-ranging authority to
enter into binding plea bargains, as well as the authority to choose the pool of jury
members for those they decide to prosecute.5 Furthermore, these unit commanders
are in a sense "mini-governors" regarding their pardon-like power to entirely, or in
I The optimal level of authority military commanders should wield, however, is beyond the
scope of this Article. The value and necessity of the entire chain of command concept as the central
organizing component of the U.S. military's structural DNA, and not simply of its military justice
system, can and should also be critically examined. Given the cyclical resurgence of new attention to
unethical, abusive military commanders, with concomitant lamentation regarding "toxic leadership"
among senior ranks, serious thought should be given to whether today's U.S. military structure is the
most optimal and whether its undemocratic elements are still necessary to maintain operational
effectiveness and success. See, e.g., Dan Dahler, Top General Calls for New Evaluations Amid
Military Scandals, CBS NEWS (Apr. 14, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-
57579529/top-general-calls-for-new-evaluations-amid-many-military-scandals/.
2 See 10 U.S.C. § 822 (2006); see also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES,
R.C.M. 306, 401 (2012) [hereinafter MCM]. See generally CRIM. LAW DEP'T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GEN.'S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., U.S. ARMY, CRIMINAL LAW DESKBOOK, at Al-2 (Vol. 1 Winter 2011-12)
(describing the process of handling misconduct within the military); Victor Hansen, Changes in
Modern Military Codes and the Role of the Military Commander: What Should the United States
Learn from this Revolution?, 16 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 419, 429 (2008) (describing commanders'
ability to dispose of criminal charges against a service member).
3 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 306(c). Regarding special and general courts-martial, the
same commander who convened, or ordered, the court-martial also chooses the service members who
will sit as the jury, if the accused service member does not elect to be tried by judge alone. 10 U.S.C.
§ 825(c)(1), (d)(2); see also Hansen, supra note 2, at 430 (noting that convening authorities choose
panel members). Since commanders convene courts-martial, they are referred to as "convening
authorities" in this role. 10 U.S.C. § 860.
4 See MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 705; see also United States v. Callahan, No. 200100696,
2003 CCA LEXIS 165, at n.3 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. July 30, 2003) ("This Court gives deference to a
CA's decision on the appropriate disposition of charges or a decision regarding the appropriate
limitations of punishment agreed to in a pretrial agreement as these decisions are also exercises of
prosecutorial discretion.") (emphasis added); see also United States v. Bulla, 58 M.J. 715 (C.G. Ct.
Crim. App. 2003).
5 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 705.
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part, set aside findings of guilt as well as to lower or commute sentences, for any
reason.6
These vast powers are largely unguided by formal direction, either in the form
of regulations or policy guidelines. Commanders operate in a criminal law system
that seems to assume that its statutory crimes, or "conduct rules" in Professor Meir
Dan-Cohen's vernacular, can be mechanistically applied to given situations
without most of the normative restraints or "decision rules" that optimally apply to
civilian prosecutors.7 Contrasted with the optimal acoustic separation provided by
decision rules working in tandem with conduct rules as outlined in Part I of this
Article, Part II demonstrates that military commanders, as super-prosecutors and
mini-governors, function in a virtual vacuum which 1) contains very little
normative policy or ethical guidance governing decisions to prosecute, to enter into
plea agreements, and to approve courts-martial findings, and 2) possesses few
systemic checks and balances regarding dispositional decisions.8 Part III argues
that while military lawyers often assist commanders in the exercise of the latter's
prosecutorial discretion, such assistance does not equate to a set of decision rules
as envisioned by Dan-Cohen. Instead, the system is one in which commanders
have "near plenary"9 authority to criminally prosecute and discipline subordinates;
the decision to prosecute, and at what level, is made by the commander and the
commander alone, largely unguided by articulated normative constraints-that is,
decision-rules.
While in practice commanders typically receive legal advice from military
attorneys prior to disposing of criminal charges and instances of misconduct,
commanders are not bound to follow such advice and are not even required to seek
it in most instances.10 Furthermore, such legal advice itself is not currently guided
6 10 U.S.C. § 860(c)(3). However, it is likely that the commander's authority to overturn
convictions will soon change. See generally Chris Carroll, Hagel: Change UCMJ to Deny
Commanders Ability to Overturn Verdicts, STARS AND STRIPES (Apr. 8, 2013),
http://www.stripes.com/hagel-change-ucmj-to-deny-commanders-ability-to-overturn-verdicts-
1.215629 (discussing proposed Congressional legislation to alter Article 60, thus removing the
commander's authority to set aside convictions in all but minor, military-related offenses).
Alternatively, the military criminal justice system assumes both that definitive normative
restraints exist, and that they are intuitively known and adhered to by commanders in the exercise of
their prosecutorial role. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARv. L. REv. 626, 627-31 (1984) (outlining two types of laws:
conduct laws which provide instructions to general society regarding their behavior and decision
rules which speak to public officials such as judges and prosecutors on how to apply the conduct
laws); see supra at Part I (outlining theoretical framework of conduct versus decision rules and the
normative role decision rules can play in such a construct).
See infra Part II.B (describing extant checks and balances).
9 See LAWRENCE J. MORRIS, MILITARY JUSTICE: A GUIDE To THE ISSUEs 4 (2010) ("The most
distinctive procedural feature of the military justice system is that decisions on what to charge,
whether to prosecute, and at what level to prosecute are made exclusively by commanders."); see also
United States v. Smith, 33 C.M.R. 85, 88 (C.M.A. 1963) ("By law, the final responsibility for
determining whether charges are to be referred for trial rests with the convening authority.").
1n See MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 406 (requiring specific advice from a judge advocate prior
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by robust, standardized ethical rules outlining factors to consider when disposing
of misconduct. Even if commanders' military lawyers were bound by particular
ethical standards serving as decision rules regarding when to prosecute-which
again, they largely are not, as this Article demonstrates' '-why should such rules
bind only the lawyers and not the commanders who are legally charged with
actually making all the key military justice decisions? That is akin to imposing
hygiene regulations on nurses in operating rooms, while concomitantly not
applying those same life-saving rules to the surgeons actually performing the
actual operations.' 2 Unfortunately in the military justice realm, neither the nurses
nor the surgeons-military lawyers and their commanders-are bound by
transparent ethical standards governing the exercise of the commander's
prosecutorial and disciplinary discretion.
This Article highlights that despite being a highly regulated, "made"' 3 legal
system with touted procedural safeguards for the accused,14 the military justice
system' s15 governing statutes and executive guidance include surprisingly few
to a commander's referral of charges to a general court-martial); cf Hansen, supra note 2, at 429
("Practically speaking, commanders are assisted by their legal advisors throughout this process, but at
the end of the day, it is the commander alone who can decide the disposition of the case."); but see
U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, INSTR. 36-6001, SEXUAL ASSAULT AND PREVENTION RESPONSE
PROGRAM, at 29 (2008) (requiring that commanders must receive advice from their staff judge
advocate before disposing of sexual assault cases in the Air Force); Sexual Assault in the Military,
Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 113th Cong., (2013) (statement of Admiral Jonathan
Greenert, U.S. Navy Chief of Nay. Ops. & Vadm Nanette M. Derenzi, U.S. Navy Judge Advocate
General), http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2013/06 June/Greenert-Derenzi_06-04-
13.pdf (describing new requirement in the U.S Navy stipulating that commanders must seek advice
from their military lawyer regarding all sexual assault cases); see MORRis, supra note 9, at 57-58
(describing the judge advocate role in the military justice system); Colonel Kenneth M. Theurer &
James W. Russell III, Why Military Justice Matters, THE REPORTER 10 (Summer 2010) ("As judge
advocates, we are responsible for providing advice on disciplinary issues and administering justice
under the UCMJ. Military justice is our core competency.").
" See infra Part III (outlining the current ethical rules applicable to military lawyers, and
highlighting their omission of specific dispositional elements).
12 This is also analogous to imposing law of armed conflict principles on intelligence analysts
and other support personnel, but not on the commander making the actual decision to employ force.
However, in this Article's regard, neither the commander nor their support personnel are subject to
normative standards regarding the exercise of disciplinary discretion.
13 See Note, Prosecutorial Power and the Legitimacy of the Military Justice System, 123
HARV. L. REv. 937, 938-39 (2010) (discussing "made" versus "grown" criminal legal systems,
characterizing the U.S. military justice system as the former because it was, for the most part,
intentionally designed according to independent variables).
14 See generally MORRIs, supra note 9, at 31-32; Hansen, supra note 2, at 427-28 (describing
systemic changes resulting from excessive commander authority over criminal justice during World
War II).
15 See, e.g., Major General Jack L. Rives & Major Steven J. Ehlenbeck, Civilian Versus
Military Justice in the United States: A Comparative Analysis, 52 A.F. L. REv. 213 (2002)
(explaining that the military criminal law process is generally referred to as the military justice
system); see generally R. Chuck Mason, Military Justice: Courts-Martial, An Overview, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV. (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41739.pdf (Grounded on the
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compass points regarding commanders' initial disposition decisions. The military
justice system's important fail safes, such as the extensive procedural safeguards of
the mandatory military appellate court system and the independent judiciary,
resulted from concern about the almost two million service members court-
martialed during World War II and the procedural gaps that allowed almost one in
four military members to be prosecuted.' 6 But today's fear, at least as articulated
by U.S. senators leading the charge to overhaul the military justice system in the
wake of a so-called sexual assault crisis, is at the opposite end of the World War II
spectrum.' 7  Concerns now abound that misconduct that should be prosecuted is
instead being ignored or inappropriately handled via lesser measures other than
criminal prosecution.' 8
This fear reflects a radical shift in attention regarding the process of military
justice. No longer must the system focus on protecting service-members from
ramrod justice and overly aggressive commanders who routinely subject military
members to trumped-up charges.' 9 Today's challenge is the inverse. Given that
the process for courts-martial currently provides substantial protection against
perverting procedural and substantive justice, once a service member is formally
charged, the focus must now shift to developing a credible mechanism for better
managing the initial decision-making process involved prior to charging-a focus
on the dynamics surrounding the initial disposition decision-to ensure that
credible allegations of criminal misconduct are not ignored or mishandled.20
U.S. Constitution, the statutory, regulatory, and judicial pillars of this system include the
Congressionally-enacted Uniform Code of Military Justice [UCMJ], which is codified in 10 U.S.C.
§§ 801-941; the MCM, which is issued by the President and supplements the UCMJ with specific
Executive Orders providing rules for courts-martial and rules of evidence; and judicial opinions
resulting from military appellate courts as well as the U.S. Supreme Court.).
16 Significant concern for the accused service member's rights in the context of inordinate
commander authority has prompted significant procedural and systemic modifications to the UCMJ
since World War II. The same level of attention has not been paid to the lack of prosecution for
certain crimes, such as sexual assault, until recently. See Bob Egelko, Victims say Military Condones
Rape, S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 28, 2012, 9:32 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/nation/articleNictims-say-
military-condones-rape-3904221.php; see also MORRIS, supra note 9, ch. 7 (overviewing major
changes to military justice system since World War II).
17 An entire Article could and should be dedicated to the prevalence of sexual assault in the
U.S. military; this Article does not serve that function. It instead focuses on a systemic failure that
the author bears witness as contributing to the sexual assault crises.
'8 See, e.g., Jeremy Herb, Gillibrand: Some Can't Distinguish Between a 'Slap on the Ass and
a Rape', THE HILL (June 4, 2013 1:10PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/policy-and-
strategy/303355-gillibrand-some-commanders-cant-distinguish-between-slap-on-the-ass-and-a-rape
(highlighting Congressional concern regarding insufficient command action).
19 See generally MORRIS, supra note 9, ch. 7 (discussing military justice practices during
World War II and the resultant changes to the UCMJ).
20 See Donna Cassata & Richard Lardner, Sexual Assaults Force Changes to Military Justice,
MILITARY.COM NEWS (June 4, 2013), http://www.military.com/daily-news/2013/06/04/sexual-
assaults-force-changes-to-military-justice.html (discussing the over 26,000 sexual assault cases); see
also Editorial Board, Military Brass Wins on Sexual Assault Bill, WASH. PoST (June 15, 2013),
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This Article takes up that challenge. It critically examines the lack of
normative guidance currently cabining commander military justice decision-
making by contrasting it with the system of decision rules and standards of conduct
applicable to civilian prosecutors in the federal U.S. criminal justice system. 21
While the civilian system is far from perfect, this Article argues that hortatory
decision rules for commanders, in the form of an ethical code of conduct inspired
by the civilian sector, would function more effectively in the military's rule-
following culture and facilitate the attainment of more consistently just decisions.
Part I grounds this analysis in the theoretical construct of conduct and decision
rules, highlighting the need for improved decision making, and therefore acoustic
separation, by way of formalized decision rules and training. Part II outlines the
military justice system's extant front-end prosecutorial process, focusing on the
role current policy guidance and systemic checks play as quasi-decision rules in
this process, while noting the inhibitory role played by the doctrine of unlawful
command influence. Part III discusses the types of decision rules applicable to
civilian prosecutors, in particular their professional standards of conduct. Part IV
synthesizes the military justice system's existing decision rules with those
applicable to civilian prosecutors to propose the outlines of a code of military
justice conduct designed to assist commanders in the responsible and just
22
execution of their prosecutorial duties. This Article concludes that commanders,
and the military members they lead, are unfairly served by the military justice
system's current lack of normative constraints, and that a professional commander
code of conduct for military justice can help right the current imbalance.
I. ACOUSTIC SEPARATION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF DECISION RULES
The military justice system's lack of guidance regarding prosecutorial
decisionS23 is incongruous with the oft-cited logic that military commanders,
trusted to make life-and-death decisions regarding subordinate service members
and others during combat, should naturally be entrusted with the (impliedly lesser)
24
responsibility of making prosecutorial decisions. This rationale is illogical
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/congress-kills-reforms-to-prevent-sexual-assault-in-the-
military/2013/06/15/302457a0-d46e-1le2-a73e-826d299ff459 story.html (discussing Congressional
attempts to remove prosecutorial discretion from military commanders).
21 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-27.000 (2010)
[hereinafter USAM]
22 This Article's proposed standards of conduct, as hortatory decision rules for commanders,
are provided as non-exhaustive exemplars in Part IV; a future article dedicated to the exact contours
of such rules, with additional detail, is necessary (and envisioned) given the discussion warranted by
such an endeavor.
23 Prosecutorial decisions as used in this Article refer primarily to those regarding the
disposition of misconduct, those regarding plea agreements, and those regarding the grant of
testimonial immunity.
24 See, e.g., Cassata & Lardner, supra note 20, at 1 14 (discussing context of Sen. Inhofe's
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because in the commander's combat arena, he or she is governed by a huge array
of laws, regulations, and standards, including the entire corpus of the law of armed
conflict. These rules contain specific principles that help prioritize values during
war: the law of armed conflict prohibits military necessity from unilaterally
trumping humanity, for example.25 Such overarching normative constraints are
incorporated into various tactical-level orders and rules, such as rules of
engagement, which represent strategic and tactical policy decisions of superiors.26
In other words, a commander is not simply left to his or her own personal devices
in determining how best to secure a village in Afghanistan, or to provide air cover
to civilians in Libya, or to conduct a raid against Osama bin Laden in Abottabad.
While these missions reflect a vast amount of discretion entrusted to commanders
regarding exact mission execution, such discretion is predicated upon the
inculcation of a set of prioritized norms-norms transmitted and trained via
decisional rules.27
The situation is markedly different regarding commanders' exercise of their
prosecutorial prerogative. Put another way, loosely using Professor Meir Dan-
Cohen's powerful paradigm of Benthamite conduct and decision rules, the military
justice system fails to provide sufficient decision rules with which to guide
commanders in their application of the UCMJ's list of criminal conduct rules. 2 8 I
the paradigmatic criminal law system, both conduct rules (those that act on the
general public to guide behavior, such as the statute prohibiting murder) and
decision rules (those directed at public officials regarding how to enforce conduct
rules, such as mandatory minimums in sentencing) operate in a complex state of
comment) ("These commanders have to make decisions to send our brave troops into battle. How
ludicrous is it that we would say to our commanders, 'You've got to make a decision to send one of
our kids into battle where they may end up losing their life, but you can't participate in the justice
system of the troops.' It doesn't make any sense at all.").
25 There are four fundamental laws of armed conflict principles: distinction, military
necessity, proportionality, and humanity. See, e.g., INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GEN.'S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., U.S. ARMY, JA 422, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 1-13
(2011).
26 See generally id. (outlining the constraining law of armed conflict, rules of engagement,
and other applicable norms governing combat operations). Critically, commanders undergo extensive
education and training on the rules applicable to combat.
27 Commanders also spend their entire careers training to execute such martial discretion,
through experiential learning modules such as those provided at the National Training Center, Fort
Irwin, California or during Red Flag exercises conducted at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. Such
military training scenarios can be quite realistic, forcing commanders to practice decision making in
particular situations. See, e.g., Field Review, In the Box Tour: Battles in Fake Iraq,
ROADSIDEAMERICA.COM (2010), http://www.roadsideamerica.com/story/21564 (describing realistic
Army training conducted at Ft. Irwin, CA); see also Pamela E. Walk, Fort Irwin Training Center
Villages Re-create Feel of Iraq, SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS (Aug. 19, 2009),
http://savannahnow.com/la/coastal-empire/2009-08-19/fort-irwin-training-center-villages-re-create-
feel-iraq (discussing Iraqi village established in California for Army training).
28 Cf Dan-Cohen, supra note 7, at 627 (outlining the two primary reductionist conflations of
decision and conduct rules, rules originally based on Jeremy Bentham's categorization of the same).
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interdependence. 29  This interdependence depends, in part, on what Dan-Cohen
calls acoustic separation: a naturally occurring situation in which decision rules are
not necessarily always known or fully understood by the public. 30
This theoretical as well as practical sense of separation is not a negative, if
appropriately balanced, because the necessary level of discretion decision-makers
require3' does not lend itself to easily-applied, bright-line rules, as opposed to
simple conduct rules. 32 In fact, to assist decision-makers such as prosecutors or
commanders when faced with misconduct in their unit, in conducting an ex post
assessment of the offender's blameworthiness,33 decision rules "frequently must be
complex, based on subjective criteria, and expressed in relatively vague and
judgmental standards."34
While decision rules are complex, subjective, and often vague, they must
actually exist for acoustic separation to work-that is, they are necessary for the
just functioning of a criminal justice system. 35 In the absence of decision rules, as
this Article suggests is largely the case in the military justice system, commanders
as prosecutorial decisionmakers may simply be considered to be mechanistically
applying conduct rules. Such application assumes that commanders act in a
"normatively unguided or uncontrolled" manner-that is, that they make arbitrary,
ad hoc decisions, unguided by particular considerations, when faced with
29 Id.
30 See generally id. at 628 (articulating the concept of acoustic separation). Dan-Cohen
recognizes that a certain level of acoustic separation naturally occurs in society, without intentional
"selective transmission" of rules. Id For example, it is not unreasonable to say that a majority of
service members court-martialed are ignorant of the current decision rules, such as the one requiring
staff judge advocate pre-trial advice before referral to a general court-martial, which is described
infra Part II.B.
3 See generally Ellen S. Podgor, The Role of the Prosecution and Defense Function
Standards: Stagnant or Progressive?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1159 (2011) (outlining the need for
prosecutorial discretion in criminal justice systems).
32 See Paul Robinson, Rules of Conduct, Principles of Adjudication, 57 U. Cii. L. REv. 729,
759 (1990) ("Because the decisionmakers applying the principles of adjudication after the violation
can be specially trained, allowed time for thoughtful application, and provided access to research and
counsel, there is less need for simplicity and easy application."). Decision rules stand in contrast to
conduct rules, which should be clearly understood to appropriately shape behavior of the general
public. See id at 759-60.
3 Id. at 731 ("The principles of adjudication function gives decisionmakers (i.e., prosecutors,
juries, and judges) guidance in assessing ex post the blameworthiness of an individual's violation of
the rules.").
34 Id. at 759. For example, convening authorities are supposed to be "unbiased and
impartial," subjective terms in and of themselves. See United States v. Allen, 31 M.J. 572, 584
(N.M.C.M.R. 1990) ("The principle that an accused is entitled to have a convening authority who is
unbiased and impartial is violated if the convening authority abrogates his responsibility in carrying
out this neutral role had been a longstanding one.").
3 What level of selective transmission is necessary (of the decision rules to the society in
question) is beyond the scope of this Article.
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misconduct disposition decisions.36  Alternatively, commanders are guided by
personal and cultural values when making prosecutorial decisions, with a wide
variance in these norms among individual commanders because of, in part, the lack
of intentional articulation of cultural values through formal decision rules.
So whether rules to guide commanders' military justice decisions are so
minimal to be non-existent, or they exist but only in a highly abstract and
inconsistent manner based on military culture and personal values, or both, the
same result potentially ensues: arbitrary enforcement, which leaves "an
inescapable residuum of injustice in the hands even of the best-intentioned
officers." 37 Therefore, the primary purpose of this Article is to highlight what little
formal decision rules are already present in the military justice system,38 and to
contrast those with the standards of conduct and ethical guidelines utilized in the
civilian prosecutorial sector in order to develop decisional touchstones for
commanders.
The term "decision rules" in this analysis is used to refer both to formal rules
guiding decision-makers' disciplinary discretion, such as the rule requiring
probable cause for prosecution, as well as to more general guiding principles, or
norms, which inform prosecutorial decisions. 40 Decision rules, in one sense,
operationalize morals. 41 This Article's recommended code of conduct includes
36 Dan-Cohen, supra note 7, at 628 (describing the realist's perspective which only
acknowledges the existence of conduct rules).
3 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 429
(1958) ("A selection for prosecution among equally guilty violators entails not only inequality, but
the exercise, necessarily, of an unguided and, hence, unprincipled discretion."). This Article does not
intend to imply that the current decision rules applicable to civilian prosecutors have cured the
civilian criminal justice system of its residuum of injustice.
38 A detailed discussion of exactly which informal decision rules, or normative constraints,
act on military commanders in their prosecutorial roles is outside the scope of this Article. However,
the author notes one example, the oft-noted phenomenon of "different spanks for different ranks."
This refers to high-ranking officers such as General William "Kip" Ward receiving
disproportionately light discipline for having committed fraud against the government through over
$80,000 of unauthorized spending. His reduction to three-star general and fine as punishment stands
in stark contrast to a hypothetical non-commissioned officer, who typically would have been
criminally prosecuted for similar conduct-hence representing the more lenient treatment high-
ranking officers often seem to receive. See Lolita C. Baldor, William Ward, Four Star General,
Demoted For Lavish Spending, Ordered To Repay $82,000, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 13, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/13/william-ward_n_2122379.html#slide=morc262485.
3 But see Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession's Failure to Discipline Unethical
Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 275, 277 (2008) (critiquing the efficacy of legal ethical rules and
citing their failure as a restraint on prosecutorial misconduct).
40 A norm is a "principle" that "establishes a standard of conduct." See David A.J. Richards,
Jurisprudence at the Crossroads: Steering a Course Between Positivism and Natural Law, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1214, 1215 (1984) (reviewing GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, LAW, NORMS AND AUTHORITY (1982)).
Norms are "'reference points' that are in fact accepted by those with the right to make authoritative
pronouncements." Id. at 1220.
41 Cf David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 50 (1996) (arguing that today's attorney ethical codes have become "de-
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decision rules which attempt to legitimize certain morals currently considered
either personal to the commander or as belonging to the military ethos, and more
procedural type rules which work to support the value of fairness-while
attempting to steer clear of Kant's warning against an "infinite regress of rules."42
It is important to note that Kant's point cannot be overstated. Prosecutorial
discretion cannot be reduced to a formula, no more than commander discretion
regarding how to defend a city can be reduced to a strict algorithm of specific
factors. However, a set of common norms can and should contribute to, and limit,
the proper exercise of such contextual discretion. This has been noted by the
Supreme Court in various contexts which call for a totality of circumstances-type
approach to decisionmaking, and is a foundational premise for the law of armed
conflict's four general principles regarding the use of armed force. 43  Both
disparate areas of the law recognize the existence of identifiable values and
prioritization rules that govern the decision process in various situations. This
Article now turns to discover just which values and rules currently frame military
commanders' decision making regarding the disposition of misconduct.
1I. U.S. MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM: PROSECUTORIAL PROCESS
A. Commanders' Monarchical Military Justice Role
As recognized since ancient times,44 organized armed forces require the
element of discipline, and obedience to orders, to be successful.4 5 Maintenance of
that essential discipline is the primary goal and hallmark of the military justice
moralized" and that in the Hart versus Fuller debate, Fuller should win. Id.)
42 Id. at 39, 49-50 (highlighting the danger, pointed out by Kant, that "reducing judgment to
rules or formulas" can simply cause a spiral of additional rules while also noting the necessity of such
rules, as long as they retain some moral content: "a jurist's conscience will function better when it is
buttressed by legal authority.").
43 See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959) (providing a totality test for
assessing voluntariness of confessions); see also Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 98-100 (1977)
(outlining a totality test for assessing voluntariness of out-of-court identifications).
4 See Michael Gibson, Canada's Military Justice System, 12 CAN. MIL. J. 61, 62 (Spring
2012); see also RICHARD A. GABRIEL & KAREN S. METZ, A SHORT HISTORY OF WAR: THE EVOLUTION
OF WARFARE AND WEAPONS, ch. 3 (1992), available at
http://www.au.af.millau/awc/awcgate/gabrmetz/gabr0010.htm (discussing the need for discipline in
armies such as the Roman Legion or Greeks in "Training").
45 See Hansen, supra note 2, at 423 (assessing militaries as organizations which require
commanders' ability to impose punishment in order to maintain discipline due to fact that soldiers
may be ordered to sacrifice their lives to accomplish a mission); see also THE COMMITTEE ON THE
UNIFORM COE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, GOOD ORDER, AND DISCIPLINE IN THE ARMY, U. S. DEP'T OF
DEF., Report to the Honorable Wilber M Brucker, Secretary ofthe Army 11 (Jan. 18, 1960) (defining
discipline as a "state of mind which leads to a willingness to obey an order no matter how unpleasant
or dangerous the task to be performed").
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system.46 The preamble to the MCA4 7 outlines that, "[t]he purpose of military law
is to promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the
armed forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment,
and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United States." 48 This need
to maintain discipline within the military via the imposition of criminal and other
punishment has also been long recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court: "The
fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition
of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be
constitutionally impermissible outside it." 49
This concept of "[d]iscipline as the soul of an army"50 has traditionally been
linked to the ability of a commander to punish his or her troops for disobedience.
The construct of the commander as prosecutor in the current U.S. military justice
system derives from the belief that a military commander must possess the
authority to hold the members of their unit criminally accountable in order to
maintain good order and discipline. The ability to prosecute ostensibly acts as a
guarantee that the commander can successfully exercise their command authority
to order these same members into dangerous situations, perhaps even to their
deaths. 5  That is, a commander's orders must be obeyed because U.S. national
46 See Hansen, supra note 2, at 423 ("Maintenance of discipline is a hallmark of military
justice .... ); see also Major General Thomas J. Fiscus, Forward, 52 A.F. L. REv. v (2002) ("While
we provide justice in individual cases, our overall focus is on ensuring good order and discipline in
the force."). Lieutenant General Richard C. Harding, A Revival in Military Justice: An Introduction
by The Judge Advocate General, THE REPORTER 4, 4-5 (Summer 2010) (describing the interplay of
military justice and discipline).
47 MCM, supra note 2, at 1 (The 2012 MCM incorporates Executive Orders providing rules
for "all amendments to the Rules for Courts-Martial, Military Rules of Evidence (Mil. R. Evid.), and
Punitive Articles made by the President in Executive Orders (EO) from 1984 to present, and
specifically including EO 13468 (24 July 2008); EO 13552 (31 August 2010); and EO 13593 (13
December 2011."). Id at A25-1. This edition also contains amendments to the UCMJ made by the
National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2009 through 2012. Id. at 1.
48 MCM, supra note 2, pt. 1, § C, at A-1. Additional reasons traditionally given for the
maintenance of a separate criminal system for the U.S. military include "I. The worldwide
deployment of military personnel; 2. The need for instant mobility of personnel; 3. The need for
speed trial to avoid loss of witnesses due to combat effects and needs; 4. The peculiar nature of
military life, with the attendant stress of combat or preparation for combat; and 5. The need for
disciplined personnel." THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.'S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., U.S. ARMY, I CRIMINAL
LAW DESKBOOK, at A-I (Winter 2011) (quoting FRANCIS A. GILLIGAN & FREDERIC I. LEDERER,
COURT-MARTIAL PROCEDURE v (3d ed. 2007)).
49 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974); see also id at 743-44 ("An army is not a
deliberative body. It is the executive arm. Its law is that of obedience. No question can be left open
as to the right to command in the officer, or the duty of obedience in the soldier." (quoting In re
Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890))).
50 ROBERT A. NOWLAN, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS, WASHINGTON TO TYLER 69 (2012). One
will rarely find an article or essay on military justice that lacks this favored quote from George
Washington's Letter to the Captains of the Virginia Regiments on July 29, 1759.
51 See, e.g., MORRIS, supra note 9, at 152.
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security depends on it, and that obedience is fundamentally secured by the
commander's ability to discipline the members of their unit.52
Because of the assumption 5 3  that commanders must be able to
administratively and criminally discipline their subordinates in order to ensure
obedience to orders, the U.S. military justice system originally gave commanders
almost plenary authority over cases of misconduct.54 However, the system has
evolved to interject a substantial role for lawyers in this process, although
commanders definitively continue to serve in the leading roles, including that of
deciding how to handle service member misconduct.55 Commanders possess the
authority to respond to misconduct with a range of responses, up to and including
the discretionary power to criminally prosecute. They possess the responsibility
to investigate allegations of misconduct as well as the authority to dispose of them
along a broad continuum, ranging from taking no action at all to prosecuting the
charges in a court-martial.57 In addition to the option of criminal prosecution,
commanders in all of the services also possess non-criminal disciplinary tools with
which to handle service member misconduct.58  Typically referred to as
administrative actions, such responses include, for example, letters of reprimand,
52 But see Major Franklin D. Rosenblatt, Non-Deployable: The Court-Martial System in
Combat from 2001 to 2009, ARMY LAw.12 (2010) (chronicling deployed U.S. military commanders
successfully ordering their subordinates into dangerous combat situations without the concomitant
legal authority to initiate court-martial proceedings against them).
5 This assumption should be critically examined, especially given the experience of other
successful Western militaries, such as the Israeli Defense Forces, which do not vest prosecutorial
authority in their commanders but rather place it in their uniformed military attorneys. However, that
examination is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Major General Menachem Finkelstein
& Yifat Tomer, The Israeli Military Legal System-Overview of the Current Situation and a Glimpse
into the Future, 52 A.F. L. REV. 137 (2002).
54 See Major Stephen A.J. Eisenberg, The Gate Search: Breaches in the Castle's
Fortifications?, 1979 ARMY LAW. 5, 5-6 (Sept. 1979).
ss See THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.'S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., U.S. ARMY, I CRIMINAL LAW
DESKBOOK, at A-I (Winter 2011) ("Given the need for discipline in the military, military justice is
under the overall control of the commander."); see also James B. Roan & Cynthia Buxton, The
American Military Justice System in the New Millennium, 52 A.F. L. REv. 185, 186 (2002) ("The
maintenance of good order and discipline is an absolutely essential function ofcommand" (emphasis
in original)).
56 See THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.'s SCH., U.S. AIR FORCE, THE MILITARY COMMANDER AND
THE LAW 116 (11th ed. 2012) ("[C]ommanders always have jurisdiction to perform administrative
actions and can hold members accountable for wrongdoing by using a variety of adverse
administrative actions such as letters of counseling, admonishment, reprimand, etc."); see also MCM,
supra note 2, R.C.M. 306(c) (listing how offenses may be disposed of).
s7 See also MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. §§ 303-306(c) (listing the different ways to dispose
of offenses).
58 SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, COMMAND POLICY REG. 600-20, § 4.6(a) at
23 (2008) [hereinafter AR 600-02] (describing administrative disciplinary tools). JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF NAVY, MANUAL OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL (JAGMAN) §§ 101-
102 (2012); see generally UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION FILE (UIF) PROGRAM, U.S. DEP'T OF AIR
FORCE, INSTR. 36-2907 (2005).
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demotions, extra training, and promotion withholdings.59
Furthermore, commanders possess nonjudicial punishment authority, as
provided in UCMJ Article 15; this process allows the commander to serve as the
judge, jury and executioner.60 An Article 15, or nonjudicial punishment [NJP],
allows the commander to punish misconduct by members of his or her unit via
forfeitures, punitive demotions, and other measures.61  While the recipient is
provided with a statutory right to refuse nonjudicial punishment offered by the
commander, doing so may result in the same commander initiating criminal
prosecution for the offense.62 A service member who refuses an Article 15 risks a
potential criminal conviction, whereby accepting Article 15 punishment avoids a
potential court-martial. Therefore, most nonjudicial punishment offers are
accepted by military members. 4
As provided in the Rules for Court-Martial [RCM], which are military
procedural rules promulgated by the president, military criminal prosecution of
specific misconduct formally consists of preferral and referral of charges. 6 The
immediate commander of the suspected service member typically decides how to
9 See MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 306(c)(2) (listing administrative corrective measures
available to commanders); see, e.g., UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION FILE (UlF) PROGRAM, supra note
58, at 29 (providing guidance on administrative reprimands, counselings and admonitions within the
Air Force); see generally THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.'s LEGAL CTR. & SCH., U.S. ARMY, 1 CRIMINAL
LAW DESKBOOK, at A-I (Winter 2011) (delineating some adverse administrative actions).
6o See 10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (2006); see also MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 306(c)(3)
(highlighting commander's option to dispose of charges via non-judicial punishment); see also
Hansen, supra note 2, at 429 (describing commander's role as "the sole adjudicator of charges
brought by the commander against the service member").
61 10 U.S.C. § 815(b).
62 Id. The military's Article 15 process of an offer and acceptance of administrative
punishment for misconduct, in lieu of criminal court-martial, seems to involve similar dynamics as
those at play in civilian plea-bargaining, though such an analysis is outside the scope of this Article.
See generally Lucian E. Dervan, The Surprising Lessons from Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of
Terror, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 239, 246-50 (2011) (emphasizing the "administrative theory" linking
the rise of plea bargains to the enhanced power of the prosecutor).
63 While an Article 15 does not legally foreclose a superior commander from pursuing court-
martial charges for the same offense(s), it is very rare for someone to be court-martialed for
something for which they already received Article 15 punishment. See United States v. Pierce, 27
M.J. 367 (C.M.A. 1989); but see United States v. McKeel, 63 M.J. 81 (C.A.A.F. 2006); United States
v. Bracey, 56 M.J. 387, 388-89 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
6 See, e.g., MORRIS, supra note 9, at 155 ("In practice, the vast majority of soldiers offered
NJP decide to accept this mechanism . . . ."); see also Patrick McLain, Nonjudicial Punishment:
Service Cultural Divides in Military Justice, COMMUNITY WAR VETERANS, Apr. 1, 2011 at 1-2,
available at http://www.communitywarvets.org/article8_41201 1.htm (describing high rate of Article
15, NJP acceptance rates).
65 The Rules for Courts-Martial are promulgated by the president at the direction of Congress
and are included within the MCM. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8; 10 U.S.C. §§ 818, 836 (2006);
Proclamation No. 13643, 78 Fed. Reg. 29559 (May 15, 2013).
66 See MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 307, 401, 403,404,407, 601.
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initially dispose of the alleged offense. However, preferral of charges is not
restricted to commanders; anyone subject to the UCMJ can formally charge
another service member by taking an oath swearing that the charges are true to the
best of his or her knowledge and belief based upon either personal knowledge or
investigation.68 The preferral oath must be administered "before a commissioned
officer of the armed forces authorized to administer oaths,"69 which is limited to
judge advocates, adjutants, and naval and coast guard commanding officers.70
The limitation as to who can administer the oath is designed, according to the
analysis accompanying the president's RCM, to help ensure "accountability for
bringing allegations," similar to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 7(c)(1)'s
requirement that an "attorney for the government" sign all indictments or
informations.71 However, the military's accountability mechanism (limiting who
can administer the oath to select commissioned officers, not just military attorneys)
seems an altogether different animal than the federal system's requirement that an
attorney actually sign the charges.72
The primary step in initiating an actual trial by court-martial involves the
referral of charges, which essentially initiates the formal criminal adversarial
process; referral power rests exclusively with particular commanders.73 "Referral
is the order of a convening authority that charges against an accused will be tried
by a specified court-martial[,]" 74 and it can only be accomplished by a commander
with delegated convening authority; such commanders are therefore referred to as
convening authorities when exercising this role. When deciding to refer
61 See id. at R.C.M. 306(a) ("Each commander has discretion to dispose of offenses by
members of that command. Ordinarily the immediate commander of a person accused or suspected
of committing an offense triable by court-martial initially determines how to dispose of that
offense."); see also THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.'s SCH., U.S. AIR FORCE, THE MILITARY COMMANDER
AND THE LAw 171, 171 (11th ed. 2012) ("By Air Force custom, the accused's immediate commander
ordinarily prefers the charge.").
68 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 307(a), (b)(2).
69 Id. at R.C.M. 307(b)(1).
70 See 10 U.S.C. § 936 (2006) (listing who is authorized to administer oaths).
71 See MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 307 app. at A21-22 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. (7)(c)(1)).
72 Stipulating that only certain officers can administer an oath seems a negligible
accountability mechanism indeed, given that the perfunctory task of administering the oath does not
include any authority to direct or modify the accusations. Furthermore, the requirement that the
accuser swear that they believe to the best of their knowledge that the charges are true is not much of
a safeguard against frivolous or malicious charges, nor is it a means to ensure warranted charges are
indeed brought. The non-attorney accuser is not required to possess, nor do they, any type of legal or
other training as to the charges, nor as to alternative methods for their disposition. Nor are they
bound by any formal standards of conduct, which require that charges not be based on only
permissible factors.
" 53A AM. JuR. 2d. Military and Civil Defense § 224 (2014).
74 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 601(a).
75 See MORRIS, supra note 9, at 41 (highlighting that Army and Air Force colonels and Navy
commanders typically act as special court-martial convening authorities, whereas general court-
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charges, 6 commanders are bound by no legally required standard besides that of
probable cause,77 despite the fact that the standard for conviction is beyond a
reasonable doubt.78
B. Decision Rules Regarding Military Prosecutorial Discretion
1. Policy Guidance Regarding Exercise of Discretion
There is relatively little formal, binding guidance to commanders regarding
which disciplinary tool, including criminal prosecution, to use in response to
misconduct. One decision rule can be found in RCM 306, Initial Disposition,
which gives each commander the "discretion to dispose of offenses by members of
that command.,s In a subsection expressly labeled as policy, it provides that
"[a]llegations of offenses should be disposed of in a timely manner at the lowest
martial convening authorities are typically two-star or above generals or admirals); see also Lindsy
Nicole Alleman, Note, Who is in Charge, and Who Should Be? The Disciplinary Role of the
Commander in Military Justice Systems, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 169 (2006). See generally
Hansen, supra note 2.
76 Typically, a unit commander prefers charges (and thereby acts as the accuser), and the
superior commander with court-martial convening authority convenes such a court. See THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GEN.'s SCH., U.S. AIR FORCE, THE MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE LAW 154, 171 (11th
ed. 2012) ("By Air Force custom, the accused's immediate commander ordinarily prefers the
charge."). A special court-martial is one of limited punishment; it is only authorized to punishments
of no more than one-year confinement and a bad-conduct discharge for enlisted service members. It
cannot dismiss an officer from their military service. See MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 201(f)(2).
n See MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 601(d)(1) (outlining the sole requirement for the basis for
referral of charges to a court-martial: "If the convening authority finds or is advised by a judge
advocate that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offense triable by a court-martial has
been committed and that the accused committed it, and that the specification alleges an offense, the
convening authority may refer it."). This standard is known as one of probable cause. MCM, supra
note 2, R.C.M. 406(b) discussion.
78 In fact, Air Force staffjudge advocates [SJA] are directed, by very senior Air Force Judge
Advocate leadership, during their formal SJA course that they should "not pass on prosecution
merely because there's a low chance at conviction." See Interview with Unnamed Air Force Official
(July 2, 2013) [notes on file with author]. This admonition reflects a debate in the civilian sector
regarding the level of evidence needed to pursue prosecution. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 39, at 284-
85 (arguing that probable cause is an inappropriately-low standard for prosecution and encourages
abuse, and urging implementation of a standard closer to beyond reasonable doubt).
7 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 306. The discussion to subsection (b) of RCM 401, titled
Forwarding and disposition of charges in general, also directs commanders to RCM 306 when
determining disposition of actual charges received. See MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 401(b)
discussion.
80 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 306(a). It further provides that "[o]rdinarily the immediate
commander of a person accused or suspected of committing an offense triable by court-martial
initially determines how to dispose of that offense." Id. This disposition decision follows a required
preliminary investigation. See MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 303.
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appropriate level of disposition listed in subsection (c) of this rule."' Subsection
(c) then lists the allowable levels of disposition, starting with the option of no
82Thotedaction. The other disposition levels include administrative measures, nonjudicial
punishment under Article 15, forwarding the matter to another commander, and
pursuing criminal charges.
This terse precatory guidance of timeliness and a preference for the lowest
"appropriate" disposition is legally binding on a commander when faced with how
to handle misconduct by a subordinate, given that the RCM are promulgated by
Executive Order.84 While the rules themselves do not explain what constitutes an
"appropriate" disposition, the non-binding discussion paragraphs of RCM 306
provide some clarification. The Discussion sections of the MCM (Discussion),
written by the Department of Defense to supplement both the Executive Order
requirements and the code, are not law, although they are considered secondary
authority.85 The RCM 306 Discussion includes the following non-binding advice
regarding the commander's disposition decision:
Many factors must be taken into consideration and balanced, including,
to the extent practicable, the nature of the offenses, any mitigating or
extenuating circumstances, the character and military service of the
accused, the views of the victim as to disposition, any recommendations
made by subordinate commanders, the interest of justice, military
exigencies, and the effect of the decision on the accused and the
command. The goal should be a disposition that is warranted,
appropriate, and fair.86
The Discussion of RCM 306(b) further explains this decision by outlining a
specific list of factors a commander should consider when deciding how to handle
a disciplinary matter.87  The majority of these factors are based on the ABA
81 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 306(b).
82 Id. at R.C.M. 306(c).
83 Id. The RCM does not explicitly list preferral of charges as an option but it is implied in
RCM 306(c)(4), which refers to RCM 401 regarding disposition of charges. The discussion
following RCM 306(c) clarifies that preferral of charges is an option.
84 See id. app. at A21-2 (noting that each rule is considered as stating "binding
requirements").
8 The Discussion sections of the MCM, compiled by the Department of Defense, do not have
the force of law, but "may describe legal requirements derived from other sources. It is in the nature
of treatise, and may be used as secondary authority." MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. intro. to analysis,
at A21-1, 2, 3; but see United States v. Foley, 37 M.J. 822, 828 (A.F.C.M.R. 1993) ("[T]here is little
value in relying upon the discussion, for it is not authoritative . . . . [T]he discussions that appear
throughout the Manual are neither legislative nor Executive and do not purport to have the force of
law.").
8 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 306(b) discussion.
87 These factors were added to the discussion section in the 1984 revision of the MCM. See
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Criminal Justice Standards for Prosecution Function 3-3.9(b) (ABA Prosecution
Function Standards),88 which are discussed in greater detail in Part III of this
Article. The list in the Discussion of RCM 306(b) includes the following factors,
in this order:
(A) the nature of and circumstances surrounding the offense and the
extent of the harm caused by the offense, including the offense's
effect on morale, health, safety, welfare, and discipline;
(B) when applicable, the views of the victim as to disposition;
(C) existence ofjurisdiction over the accused and the offense;
(D) availability and admissibility of evidence;
(E) the willingness of the victim or others to testify;
(F) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or conviction of
others;
(G) possible improper motives or biases of the person(s) making the
allegation(s);
(H) availability and likelihood of prosecution of the same or similar and
related charges against the accused by another jurisdiction;
(I) appropriateness of the authorized punishment to the particular
accused or offense;
(J) the character and military service of the accused; and
(K) other likely issues.89
These RCM Discussion factors were revised in 2012, resulting in a changed
order, as well in the addition of consideration of the victim as a new issue relevant
to the disposition decision as factor (B). 90 The order change primarily consisted of
moving "the character and military service of the accused" from its original, long-
standing position as the first factor, to the second-to-last factor on the list.91
The Department of Defense lawyers who drafted the above list, while
explicitly adopting these factors from the ABA Prosecution Function Standards
extant in 1984, did not adopt them all. They intentionally excluded several of the
prosecutorial discretion factors found in the ABA Prosecutorial Function
Standards. For example, ABA Prosecutorial Function Standard 3-3.9(b)(i) advises
MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 306 app. at A21-21.
88 Several factors are based on the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(b) (1993) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION
FUNCTION]. While the second edition of the ABA Prosecution Function Standards (1980) was used
for the original 1984 MCM discussion, the incorporated standards remain in the current edition of the
MCM. The third edition of the ABA Prosecution Function Standards have retained these as well,
though found in different listing sequence. See MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 306 app. at A21-21;
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(b) (1993).
89 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 306(b).
90 Id
91 Id
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prosecutors to consider, as a relevant factor when weighing criminal charges, "the
prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is, in fact, guilty." 92  The
Discussion drafters considered this decision rule "inconsistent with the convening
authority's judicial function,"9  and therefore omitted it from their list of
recommended factors guiding prosecutorial discretion. 94
Furthermore, the Discussion excludes ABA Prosecutorial Function Standard
3-3.9(a)'s requirement that charges should not be instituted without probable
cause, and the admonition that "[a] prosecutor should not institute, cause to be
instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of
sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction."95 The drafters explained
the omission of both guidelines by stating that "probable cause is followed in the
rule."96 RCM 601, Referral, at (d)(1) indeed requires as a basis for referral for all
types of courts-martial that the convening authority find or be advised by a judge
advocate that "there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offense triable by a
court-martial has been committed and that the accused committed it;" that is, the
commander must have probable cause to prosecute. While this probable cause
92 STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 88, at § 3-39(b)(i). This standard was
3-3.9(b)(i) in the 1980 edition, as well. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION
FUNCTION § 3-39(b)(i) (1980).
9 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 306(b), at A21-21 (citing no case law to support this
assumption). The reference to the commander's prosecutorial decision here as a "judicial function" is
perplexing, as well as inaccurate. The military appellate courts have, since the late 1980s,
characterized the convening authority's power to criminally prosecute as prosecutorial. See United
States v. Fernandez, 24 M.J. 77, 78 (C.M.A. 1987) ("In referring a case to trial, a convening authority
is functioning in a prosecutorial role."). See also United States v. Allen, 31 M.J. 572, 584
(N.M.C.M.R. 1990) ("[W]hen a convening authority refers a case to court-martial he is functioning in
a prosecutorial rather than a judicial role.").
94 The absence of this factor is out-of-step with the current ABA Prosecution Function
Standards and other prosecutorial guidelines. See NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N, NAT'L
PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 4-1.3(a) 2009),
http://www.ndaa.org/pdflNDAA%20NPS%203rd%20Ed.%20w%20Revised%20Commentary.pdf
[hereinafter DA STANDARDS] ("Prosecutors should screen potential charges to eliminate from the
criminal justice system those cases where prosecution is not justified or not in the public interest.
Factors that may be considered in this decision include: a. Doubt about the accused's guilt. . . ").
9s STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 88, at § 3-3.9(a). Most states utilize
the probable cause standard, but the DoJ requires sufficient admissible evidence. See DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-27.220 (2010) ("The attorney for the government
should commence or recommend Federal prosecution if he/she believes that the person's conduct
constitutes a Federal offense and that the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain
and sustain a conviction .... ).
96 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 306, at A21-21 ("§ 3-3.9(a) (probable cause) is followed in the
rule . . . ."). Regarding the Standards' factor of "sufficient admissible evidence" as a factor to
consider when initiating criminal charge, the Discussion factors listed following RCM 306(b) advise
that commanders should consider "availability and admissibility" of evidence and does not discuss
pendency of the charges whatsoever.
9 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 601(d)(1). The Analysis notes that while probable cause was
required for referring charges to a general court-martial [GCM], the 1984 revisions to the rules
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determination must be made by a judge advocate to refer charges to a general
court-martial, RCM 601(d)(1) makes clear that a commander with convening
authority power can unilaterally make this finding in a summary or special court-
martial without a lawyer's advice.98 Additionally, RCM 307, which is based on
Article 30, requires that the accuser swear that the charges are true to the best of
their knowledge and belief.99
The Discussion drafters further noted that they disregarded several other ABA
Prosecution Function Standards because they considered them "unnecessary in
military practice."' 00 These included the standard that the prosecutor should give
no weight to potential personal or political advantages, nor to enhancing one's
record of convictions, when exercising prosecutorial discretion.io' They also
omitted the standard providing, "[i]n cases which involve a serious threat to the
community, the prosecutor should not be deterred from prosecution by the fact that
in the jurisdiction juries have tended to acquit persons accused of the particular
kind of criminal act in question."1 02 Lastly, the Discussion drafters noted that the
ABA Prosecution Function Standard that "a prosecutor should not bring or seek
charges greater in number or degree than can reasonably be supported with
evidence at trial or than are necessary to fairly reflect the gravity of the offense,"1o3
was "implicit in § 3-3.9(a) and in the rule requiring probable cause" and therefore
also not included. 30
2. Supplemental Guidance
RCM 306(b) Discussion's recommended factors regarding disposition of
alleged misconduct lack in both strength and numbers and fail to provide
comprehensive guidance to commanders exercising their statutory prosecutorial
discretion. As discussed in Part III of this Article, military lawyers advising
commanders are subject to binding standards of conduct regarding their military
expanded this basis to apply to all referrals, and not just GCMs. See id. at A21-31.
98 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 601(d)(1); see also id. at A21-31 ("Because of the judicial
limitations on the sentencing power of special and summary courts-martial, any judge advocate may
make the determination or the convening authority may do so personally.").
' 10 U.S.C. § 830(a) (2006) states, "Charges and specification shall be signed by a person
subject to this chapter under oath before a commissioned officer of the armed forces authorized to
administer oaths. . ." (emphasis added); see also MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 307(a).
100 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 306(b), at A21-21.
101 The ABA Prosecution Function Standards second edition listed these two standards as
sections 3-3.9(c) and (d), though in the ABA Prosecution Function Standards third edition they are
found at (d) and (e), respectively. STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION supra note 81, at § 3-
3.9(c)-(e). The MCM Analysis analyzing the list of factors found in the Discussion to R.C.M. 306(b)
refers to the second edition. Id
102 See id. at § 3-3.9(e).
103 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9.
104MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 306, at A21-21.
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justice roles, but the commanders they are advising-who wield almost plenary
prosecutorial and disciplinary authority-are not. os While there exists some
regulatory guidance to supplement the Discussion's limited precatory list, the
supplementary concerns are largely duplicative. Specifically, Part V of the MCM,
which outlines procedures for the imposition of NJP for minor UCMJ offenses,
includes a policy section discussing commanders' exercise of their discretion in the
misconduct arena.' 06 It emphasizes that NJP should be considered on an individual
basis and that "the nature of the offense, the record of the servicemember, the
needs for good order and discipline, and the effect of nonjudicial punishment on
the service member and the service member's record" should be considered when
weighing whether to impose NJP. 07
The various service regulations governing the use of disciplinary measures
also include rather limited guidance regarding the appropriateness of each,
guidance that largely echoes RCM 306(b) and its Discussion factors. The various
regulations stress using the least severe measures appropriate to the misconduct:
"Commanders should consider administrative corrective measures before deciding
to impose nonjudicial punishment. Trial by court-martial is ordinarily
inappropriate for minor offenses unless lesser forms of administering discipline
would be ineffective."108 They also reinforce, to varying degrees, the concept of
fairness in responding to misconduct that is first mentioned in the non-binding
Discussion to RCM 306(b): "Discretion, fairness, and sound judgment are essential
ingredients of military justice."' 09
1os See infra Part III.B.1 (outlining the rules applicable to military lawyers, while noting that
even the military lawyers lack comprehensive standards regarding the dispositional decision, whether
binding or non-binding).
106 MCM, supra note 2, Part V.
10 Id. at Part. V, 1 1. It also provides factors for commanders to consider when deciding
whether a UCMJ offense is minor: "the nature of the offense and the circumstances surrounding its
commission; the offender's age, rank, duty assignment, record and experience; and the maximum
sentence imposable for the offense if tried by general court-martial." Id.
1os AR 600-20, supra note 58, at T 4-6(a); see also U.S. DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, INSTR. 51-202,
NONJUDICIAL PUNISHMENT 6 (2003) [hereinafter AFI 51-202] ("Commanders should consider, where
appropriate, nonpunitive disciplinary measures, such as counseling, administrative reprimands and
administrative withholding of privileges before resorting to NJP, but such measures are not necessary
before imposing NJP."); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE 1 3-2 (2011)
[hereinafter AR 27-10] ("A commander should use nonpunitive measures to the fullest extent to
further the efficiency of the command before resorting to nonjudicial punishment."); U.S. DEP'T OF
NAVY, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS INSTR. 3120.32C, STANDARD ORGANIZATION AND REGULATIONS
OF THE U.S. NAVY 1-9 (1994) (C6, 26 May 2005) [hereinafter OPNAVINST 3120.32C] ("[A]s
another administrative corrective measure that may be employed by superiors to correct infractions of
military regulation or performance deficiencies in their subordinates when punitive action does not
appear appropriate due to the minor nature of the infraction or deficiency.").
10 See, e.g., AR 600-20, supra note 58, at T 4.6(a) ("Military authority is exercised promptly,
firmly, courteously and fairly."); see also AFT 51-202, supra note 108, at 11 ("The commander's
action must be temperate, just, and conducive to good order and discipline."); OPNAVINST
3120.32C, supra note 108, at 1-5 ("Leadership must ensure equity for each member of the
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The Air Force includes a distinct decision rule in its regulation regarding
military justice, which appears to encourage commanders to lower or even
disapprove of sentences when an accused has been good in combat. Found in the
section regarding convening authorities' discretion to approve of court-martial
findings and sentences, it states in pertinent part:
Convening authorities should consider an accused's service in an area of
combat operations in determining what punishment, if any, to approve.
Where the sentence of an accused with an outstanding record in an area
of combat operations extends to a punitive discharge, convening
authorities should consider suspending or remitting the discharge,
provided that return to duty is in the best interests of the Air Force. 10
3. Systemic Aspects Which Function Like Decision Rules
i. No "Policy Guides" Allowed: The Consequences of Article 37
There are few formal checks and balances on commanders' expansive
disciplinary and prosecutorial discretion."' The primary check on their
prosecutorial discretion is the superior commander's authority to withdraw both
criminal prosecutorial and NJP authority from subordinate commanders, either for
particular types of offenses or in general.1 2  If such authority has not been
withheld, then independent disposition discretion rests in each commander." 3
organization.").
110 U.S. DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, INSTR. 51-201, ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY JUSTICE 154
(2013) [hereinafter AFI 51-201].
. See AR 600-20, supra note 58, at T 4-7(a) ("Commanding officers exercise broad
disciplinary powers in furtherance of their command responsibilities."); OPNAVINST 3120.32C,
supra note 108, at 1-6 ("Leaders and supervisors have a duty to hold their subordinates accountable,
and to initiate appropriate corrective, administrative, disciplinary, or judicial action when individuals
fail to meet their responsibilities."); MORRIS, supra note 9, at 4 ("[C]ommanders enjoy tremendous
discretion and near plenary authority to bring charges, pick juries, approve (or disapprove) findings
and sentences, and grant clemency."); see generally Hansen, supra note 2, at 428 ("Under the current
version of the UCMJ, the commander still has extensive power in investigating and charging soldiers
112 See MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 306(a) ("A superior commander may withhold the
authority to dispose of offenses in individual cases, types of cases, or generally."); see also United
States v. Hardy, 4 M.J. 20, 24 n.9 (C.M.A. 1977) ("[T]he superior might withhold the decision as to
referral of a case to court-martial to himself for a specified class of cases if such a class of offenses
presented a particular disciplinary need within that command."); AR 27-10, supra note 108, at 3-
7(d) ("Any commander having authority under UCMJ, Art. 15 may limit or withhold the exercise of
such authority by subordinate commanders. For example, the powers of subordinate commanders to
exercise UCMJ Art. 15 authority over certain categories of military personnel, offenses, or individual
cases may be reserved by a superior commander. A superior authority may limit or withhold any
power that a subordinate might otherwise have under this paragraph.").
113 See MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 103(5) ("'Commander' means a commissioned officer in
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Typically, as stated in RCM 306(a) and discussed above, "[e]ach commander has
discretion to dispose of offenses by members of that command. Ordinarily the
immediate commander of a person accused or suspected of committing an offense
triable by court-martial initially determines how to dispose of that offense."11 4
This grant of discretion specifically translates into a prohibition against superior
commanders directing-either explicitly or implicitly-subordinate commanders
how to dispose of either a particular case or types of cases: "[a] superior
commander may not limit the discretion of a subordinate commander to act on
cases over which authority has not been withheld." 15
This prohibition against superior commanders directing particular disciplinary
outcomes results from Article 37,116 which represents Congress's intent to
eradicate improper commander influence on court-martial outcomes following
abuses during Word War 11. " The UCMJ attempts to balance giving commanders
tremendous, "near plenary" authority to discipline subordinates via administrative
command or an officer in charge. . ."); see also MCM, supra note 2, Part V, 2(a) ("'Commander'
means a commissioned or warrant officer who, by virtue of rank and assignment, exercises primary
command authority over a military organization or prescribed territorial area, which under pertinent
official directives is recognized as a 'command."').
114 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 306(a).
11 Id. See, e.g., AR 600-20, supra note 58, at 4-7(c) ("Commanders will neither direct
subordinates to take particular disciplinary actions, nor unnecessarily restrict disciplinary authority of
subordinates."); see also United States v. Allen, 31 M.J. 572, 584 (N.M.C.M.R. 1990) ("Except for
the decision to refer, an officer who exercises court-martial convening authority is required to fill a
neutral role in the court-martial process . . . ."). For example, the Department of Defense has
withheld disposition authority regarding rape, sexual assault, and sodomy from lower level
commanders. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., INSTR. 6495.02, SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE
(SAPR) PROGRAM PROCEDURES 41-42 (2013) [hereinafter DODI 6495.02] ("In accordance with
Secretary of Defense Memorandum . . . the initial disposition authority is withheld from all
commanders within the Department of Defense who do not possess at least special court-martial
convening authority and who are not in the grade of 0-6 (i.e., colonel or Navy captain) or higher, with
respect to the alleged offenses of rape, sexual assault, forcible sodomy, and all attempts to commit
such offenses, in violation of Articles 120, 125, and 80 ... [of the UCMJ].").
"' See 10 U.S.C. § 837(a) (2006) ("No authority convening a general, special, or summary
court-martial, nor any other commanding officer, may censure, reprimand, or admonish the court or
any member, military judge, or counsel thereof, with respect to the findings or sentence adjudged by
the court, or with respect to any other exercise of its or his functions in the conduct of the
proceedings. No person subject to this chapter may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized means,
influence the action of a court-martial or any other military tribunal or any member thereof, in
reaching the findings or sentence in any case, or the action of any convening, approving, or reviewing
authority with respect to his judicial acts. The foregoing provisions of the subsection shall not apply
with respect to (1) general instructional or informational courses in militaryjustice if such courses are
designed solely for the purpose of instructing members of a command in the substantive and
procedural aspects of courts-martial, or (2) to statements and instructions given in open court by the
military judge, president of a special court-martial, or counsel.").
"7 See generally Lieutenant Colonel Erik C. Coyne, Influence With Confidence: Enabling
Lawful Command Influence By Understanding Unlawful Command Influence-A Guide For
Commanders, Judge Advocates, and Subordinates, 68 A.F. L. REv. 1, 4-6 (2012) (outlining the
historical roots of Article 37, UCMJ's prohibition on unlawful command influence).
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as well as criminal measures, with the danger of superior commanders either
ordering specific outcomes in disciplinary cases being handled by subordinates or
attempting to influence the outcome of courts-martial." 8  When such unlawful
command influence conduct is alleged in connection with a court-martial, it can
become the basis for various motions by the defense, both during the pendency of
the court-martial as well as during the appellate process." 9
Primarily because of Article 37, commanders and the military in general have
been leery to promulgate formal, comprehensive policy guidance regarding how to
dispose of misconduct.120 This apprehension seems to explain a surprising gap in
guidance in the otherwise extensively regulated military justice process. The NJP
section of the MCM, as well as the service regulations, reiterates the same Article 37-
based restriction against command guidance regarding how to dispose of types of
misconduct.121 For example, the MCM in relevant part states: "No superior may
direct that a subordinate authority impose nonjudicial punishment in a particular
case, issue regulations, orders, or "guides" which suggest to subordinate authorities
that certain categories of minor offenses be disposed of by nonjudicial punishment
instead of by court-martial or administrative corrective measures ... " 22
But particularly for this Article's purposes, it is important to note that the
military appellate courts have emphasized that general guidance that does not
restrict subordinate commanders' discretion is acceptable. 23  That is, broadly
written principles designed to assist commanders' decision-making, which serve to
guide rather than mandate particular results, would be consistent with Article 37's
prohibition against unlawful command influence while assuring "regularity
118 See, e.g., MoRuis, supra note 9, at 4 ("Commanders enjoy tremendous discretion and near
plenary authority to bring charges, pick juries, approve (or disapprove) findings and sentences, and
grant clemency.").
" See generally Coyne, supra note 117, at 9-16 (describing various ways to litigate unlawful
command influence). Additionally, Article 98 makes unlawful command influence, and any
intentional violation of courts-martial procedure, a criminal offense. However, it is difficult to find
any cases in which Article 98 was ever prosecuted. See, e.g., United States v. Day, 21 C.M.R. 768,
777-78 (A.F.B.R. 1956) (discussing the perils of bringing an Art. 98 violation).
120 See Coyne, supra note 117, at 4 (describing commanders' inaction due to fear of claims of
unlawful command influence).
121 MCM, supra note 2, Part V.
122 Id. at I Id(2).
123 See generally United States v. Allen, 31 M.J. 572, 584, 592-93 (N.M.C.M.R. 1990) ("[A]
person who is a convening authority, or the superior of a convening authority, may issue directives
and announce policies for adherence by subordinates as long as those directives do not require the
convening authority to abdicate his independent judgment while performing his court-martial
responsibilities."); but see United States v. Martinez, 42 M.J. 327, 331-34 (C.A.A.F. 1995)
(Commander's policy letter stating that reduction in grade and $500 fine was "starting point" for
driving under the influence constituted clear unlawful command influence, despite the letter also
stating that "[p]unishment for DUI will be individualized").
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without regimentation, to prevent unwarranted disparity without sacrificing
necessary flexibility."' 24
ii. Impartiality, Probable Cause, Pretrial Advice, and Article 32 Hearings
Further cabining convening authority's prosecutorial discretion is the
requirement that they be "unbiased and impartial."1 25 This largely case-law driven
limitation is implemented by the Code's prohibition against "accusers" referring
charges to a special or general court-martial. 126 Accusers include not only those
military members who prefer or order that charges be referred, but they also
include "any other person who has an interest other than an official interest in the
prosecution of the accused."l 27 That is, the commander who prefers charges' 28
cannot refer the same charges, and neither can the convening authority that was a
victim of the accused's alleged crime.' 29
Another intended check on prosecutorial discretion, at least for general courts-
martial,130 is the procedural requirement for written legal advice found in Article
124 USAM, supra note 21, at § 9-27.001 (2010).
125 Allen, supra note 123, at 584. However, this language is not found in the UCMJ itself nor
in any military regulations governing military justice; practitioners must turn to military case law to
find the standard.
126 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 822(b), 823(b) (2006) (providing that accusers cannot convene general or
special courts-martial); see also MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 601, 401 (outlining referral and
preferral, respectively, and stating prohibition on accuser referring charges).
127 10 U.S.C. § 801(9); see United States v. Dinges, 55 M.J. 308, 312 (C.A.A.F. 2001)
("Personal interests relate to matters affecting the convening authority's ego, family, and personal
property. A convening authority's dramatic expression of anger towards an accused might also
disqualify the commander if it demonstrates personal animosity. However, an officer need not act
with animus or anger to become an accuser. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces] has found
that there is a personal interest when the convening authority is the victim of the accused's attempted
burglary; where the accused tries to blackmail the convening authority by noting that his son was a
drug abuser; and where the accused has potentially inappropriate personal contacts with the
convening authority's fiancee. However, a convening authority is not disqualified because of
'misguided prosecutorial zeal,' or where the convening authority issues an order that the accused
violates." Id. at 310-11 (citations omitted)).
128 Preferral, or swearing to formal charges, is generally the first formal step leading to
prosecution via court-martial. See infra Part II.B.
129 See generally Allen, 31 M.J. at 584 ("The accuser concept differs from unlawful command
influence in that it denotes someone who has such a personal interest in, or has predetermined the
outcome of, the case that his judgment could reasonably be questioned. To preclude the personal
interest of the accuser a procedure was created whereby 'an accused could be brought to trial in an
atmosphere free from coercion by one who could, directly or indirectly, influence the court.. . . This
atmosphere requires that the officer who convenes the court and reviews the sentence shall himselfbe
free from any influence from the accuser."' (quoting United States v. LaGrange, 3 C.M.R. 76, 79
(1952)). Of course, simply because misconduct in general undermines the good order and discipline
of a particular commander's unit does not mean that the commander is considered a victim.
13o The military justice system consists of three distinct types of court-martial: special,
summary, and general. Special and summary are jurisdictionally limited regarding types of
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34, combined with the requirement in Article 32 for a formal, impartial
investigation of the charges prior to referral.13 1  Article 34 stipulates that a
commander's staff judge advocate must find that the allegations are warranted by
the evidence reported in the required investigation prior to the commander
referring a charge to a general court-martial.132 Whether the evidence warrants the
charges must be determined using a probable cause standard.133  Additionally,
while neither Article 32's formal investigation nor Article 34's pretrial advice are
required for special or summary courts-martial, all three types of military courts
require that the convening authority find probable cause before referring the
charges to court-martial.134
While a convening authority must find that there are reasonable grounds that
the accused committed an offense triable by court-martial prior to referring charges
and thereby convening a particular type of court-martial, the Discussion to the
MCM points out that "the convening authority is not obliged to refer all charges
which the evidence might support" and refers convening authorities to the factors
contained in the Discussion to RCM 306(b) discussed above.135
iii. Constitutional Decision Rules
While the military appellate courts have emphasized the broad prosecutorial
discretion vested in the commander as convening authority, they have also noted
that this discretion is not completely unfettered: "[t]he convening authority is, of
course, vested with considerable discretion in determining whether to refer
charges, and what to refer, so long as his selection is not deliberately based upon
unjustifiable standards."' 6  That is, while military prosecutorial decisions are
granted deference and a presumption of regularity,'3 7 they remain subject to
punishment, whereas a general court-martial has no such limitation. See 10 USC §§ 816-20; see also
MORRIS, supra note 9, at 41 (describing the different types of court-martial as differing by maximum
punishments, level of command that can convene each, and extent of appellate process for each).
"' 10 U.S.C. § 834; see also 10 U.S.C. § 832 (requiring a formal, impartial investigation of
charges prior to referral to a general court-martial); MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 405 (detailing the
Article 32 process); id. at R.C.M. 406 (outlining codal requirement for legal advice prior to
convening a general court-martial). The Article 32 hearing has been characterized as additional
insulation against command influence, though its recommendations are not binding upon the
convening authority. See generally United States v. Smith, 33 C.M.R. 85, 89 (C.M.A. 1963)
(describing staff judge advocate pretrial advice as "a valuable pretrial protection to an accused.");
MoRms, supra note 9, at 55-56 (describing the Article 32 investigation and hearing).
132 10 U.S.C. § 834(c); MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 406.
'3 See MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 406(b) discussion (clarifying probable cause standard for
pretrial advice finding that the evidence warrants the charges).
134 See id at R.C.M. 601(d)(1).
135 See idat R.C.M. 601(d)(1) discussion.
136 United States v. Blanchette, 17 M.J. 512, 515 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983).
137 United States v. McKinley, 48 M.J. 280, 282 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (citing presumption of
regularity in UCMJ proceedings); see also United States v. Hagen, 25 M.J. 78, 84 (C.M.A. 1987)
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constitutional constraints, namely those derived from the Due Process Clause-
either because they violate the equal protection component of the constitutional
provision-or because they are vindictive in nature. 8 Specifically, the military
courts weigh convening authorities' decisions to prosecute "for vindictive
prosecution, impermissible discrimination against certain classes of defendants, or
malicious and discriminatory prosecution in multiplying the number of charges
brought."139
Regarding selective prosecution,140 the highest military appellate court has
noted that:
For the government to make distinctions does not violate equal
protection guarantees unless constitutionally suspect classifications like
race, religion, or national origin are utilized or unless there is an
encroachment on fundamental constitutional rights like freedom of
speech or of peaceful assembly. The only requirement is that
reasonable grounds exist for the classification used.141
This constitutional guarantee of equal protection applies not only to the
charging decision but also to the convening authority's prosecutorial power to
enter into plea bargain agreements.14 2
In addition to the checks on prosecutorial discretion grounded in the
constitutional Equal Protection doctrine, the prosecutorial decision is also limited
by the separate doctrines of unreasonable multiplication of charges and multiplicity
of charges.14 3 While the latter is designed to guard against constitutional Double
Jeopardy violations and focuses on the elements of the alleged crime, the doctrine
of unreasonable multiplication of charges specifically aims to limit "overreaching
("There is a strong presumption that the convening authority performs his duties as a public official
without bias.").
1 McKinley, 48 M.J. at 282 ("And although the Executive exercises broad discretion in
deciding whether or not to prosecute, the decision is subject to review under the equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause."); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)
(A prosecutorial decision may not be "deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race,
religion, or other arbitrary classification." (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962))).
1 United States v. Callahan, No. 200100696, 2003 CCA LEXIS 165, at *5 n.2 (N-M. Ct.
Crim. App. July 30, 2003).
140 The highest military appellate court has also recognized the impropriety of vindictive
prosecution, which it defines as the decision to prosecute in retaliation for the exercise of certain
constitutional rights; see generally Hagen, 25 M.J. at 84 ("As with a charge of selective prosecution,
an accused must show more than a mere possibility of vindictiveness; he must show discriminatory
intent.") (citing United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc)).
141 United States v. Means, 10 M.J. 162, 165 (C.M.A. 1981).
142 Callahan, 2003 CCA LEXIS at *8 n.3.
143 See MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 307(c)(4) ("What is substantially one transaction should
not be made the basis for an unreasonable multiplication of charges against one person.").
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in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion," and "promotes fairness
considerations."' " It requires the convening authority to avoid "piling on" of
charges and overreaching in their prosecutorial decision.145
III. CIVILIAN PROSECUTORIAL DECISION RULES
The paucity and haphazard nature of the current guidance for commanders
regarding the exercise of their vast military justice authorities, as highlighted in the
preceding section, stands in stark opposition to the typically robust training and
guidance military members receive regarding virtually all other military
functions. 14 6 Furthermore, contrast the military's minimal prosecutorial guidance
with the ethical rules and policy guidance that apply to prosecutors in the civilian,
particularly the federal, criminal justice arena.147 In addition to the general ethical
rules binding on attorneys as such, specific prosecutorial guidance has developed
out of the recognition of the awesome power prosecutors wield in American
society.148 As noted by Professor Angela Davis and other criminal justice scholars,
"[p]rosecutors are the most powerful officials in the criminal justice system." 49
That power requires direction: "[w]ithout enforceable laws or policies to guide that
discretion, all too often it is exercised haphazardly at worst and arbitrarily at best,
144 See United State v. Campbell, 71 M.J. 19, 23 (C.A.A.F. 2012); see also United States v.
Quiroz, 55 M.J. 334, 337 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (affirming that multiplicity and unreasonable
multiplication of charges are distinct doctrines).
145 Id. at 338. This constraint has been described as a policy-based one "established by the
President in successive editions of the Manual for Courts-Martial designed to promote equity in
sentencing."; see also Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Breslin & Lieutenant Colonel LeEllen Coacher,
Multiplicity and Unreasonable Multiplication of Charges: A Guide to the Perplexed, 45 A.F. L. REV.
99, 100 (1998).
146 Military members are famously told how to dress, how to talk, how to change a tire, and
how to take a hill-but they are not told how to exercise prosecutorial discretion. See supra Part I.B;
see, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, INSTR. 13-IBCCVI, BATTLE CONTROL CENTER TRAINING 6
(2012) (detailing how air command and control defense personnel are to be trained); U.S. DEP'T OF
ARMY, REG. 670-1, WEAR AND APPEARANCE OF ARMY UNIFORMS AND INSIGNIA (2012) (detailing the
wear and composition of Army uniforms as well as providing general personal appearance
guidelines).
147 This Article turns to guidance specifically applicable to prosecutors because, as noted by
the military appellate courts, commanders exercise prosecutorial power regarding the disposition of
offenses, as well as in the pre-trial agreement approval process. Furthermore, this Article focuses on
prosecutors versus lawyers in general because, as noted by Professor Angela Davis, "[tihe duties and
responsibilities of all prosecutors clearly are distinguishable from lawyers who represent clients."
See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 13 (2007).
148 See generally Mitchell Stephens, Ignoring Justice: Prosecutorial Discretion and the Ethics
of Charging, 35 N. KY. L. REv. 53, 53 (2008) ("The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty,
and reputation than any other person in America." (quoting Attorney General Robert H. Jackson, The
Federal Prosecutor, 24 JUDICATURE 18, 18 (1940))).
149 Davis, supra note 39, at 276.
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resulting in inequitable treatment of both victims and defendants."i50 To date in
the civilian sector, this guidance has largely come in the form of legal ethics, also
referred to as standards of professional conduct, as well as policy manuals-areas
to which this Article now turns.' 5 1
A. Professional Standards for Attorneys: States' Codes
Attorneys in the United States, as professionals,15 2 are governed by both
mandatory and aspirational legal ethics.'53 While the term ethics in general often
refers to the discipline of moral philosophy,154 or one's personal theory of moral
principles, legal ethics in this Article refers to the "principles of conduct that
members of the profession are expected to observe in the practice of law."155 After
considerable training and education, lawyers are licensed to practice law, work
which is legally forbidden to non-lawyers,'56 at least outside the military.'57 These
licenses, required by each state in order to practice law in that jurisdiction, subject
lawyers to specific standards of conduct. These ethical guidelines are designed to
help lawyers discriminate between proper and improper conduct in the practice of
law. 58 These standards, also called codes of professional conduct or professional
responsibility, are promulgated by each state's highest court or a subordinate
regulatory body, and carry disciplinary sanctions overseen by the same. 59
150 See DAVIS, supra note 147, at 13.
151 See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2013), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professionairesponsibility/publications/model rules of profess
ionalconduct/model rules of professional conduct table of contents.html [hereinafter ABA
MODEL RULES].
152 But see Luban & Millemann, supra note 41, at 35 (criticizing emphasis on professionalism
within the practice of law as "antiseptic" and lacking public commitment).
1s3 See, e.g., LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF
LAW 6 (3d ed. 2012) ("Joining the legal profession requires mastery of a large and complex body of
externally imposed ethical and legal standards.").
154 See generally id. at 3 (discussing the difference between ethics and morals).
15s Id. at 4. These principles are established out of a sense of a lawyer's special place in
American society: "A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an
officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality ofjustice."
ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 151, at pmbl. 1.
156 See ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 151 at 5.5 (2013).
157 Except in the case of convening authorities practicing law in their prosecutorial roles,
which is the practice of law but authorized by the UCMJ. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2006).
1ss See generally LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 153, at 5, 49 (describing purpose of ethical
codes). While the law governing lawyers is much broader than professional rules of ethics and
includes applicable state and federal statutes, regulations, case law, client-issued rules, etc., this
Article focuses on professional rules of ethics as the most analogous. See id. at 24.
159 State ethics codes represent "the most important source of guidance for lawyers about their
ethical obligations." See id. at 45.
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Sanctions for violating state codes of conduct range from censure to disbarment.160
These state-mandated rules of professional conduct for lawyers are primarily
based on the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct
[ABA Model Rules], which include a rule specifically governing prosecutors.
ABA Model Rule 3.8 outlines what it calls the "special responsibilities" of a
prosecutor, and includes: a prohibition against prosecuting a charge for which
there is no probable cause; a provision regarding prejudicial extrajudicial
statements; exculpatory and mitigating evidence disclosure requirements; 62 and
remedial measures regarding evidence of wrongful convictions. 63  The non-
binding comments explain the need for this prosecutor-specific rule: "[a]
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an
advocate."1 64 This prosecutor-specific rule supplements rather than displaces the
other ABA Model Rules; that is, all the rules, such as those requiring lawyers to be
"competent, prompt and diligent," and those providing guidance on how to resolve
conflicts of interest, also apply to lawyers in their prosecutorial role. 65
1. Military Application
In the U.S. military, uniformed lawyers, also known as judge advocates, are
required to be licensed, and found in good standing, in at least one state, and
therefore are governed by that state's rules of professional conduct (which, as
noted above, are typically based on the ABA Model Rules).'66 Additionally, each
of the military services promulgates rules of professional conduct that apply to
military and civilian attorneys, paralegals, and assistants working in their
respective judge advocate divisions, as well as to civilian lawyers practicing in
their courts.' 67 Notably, these service rules of professional conduct do not apply to
160 See id at 32 (outlining types of disciplinary sanctions that can result from violation of state
rules of professional conduct).
161 ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 151. See also LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 153, at 25
(discussing the ABA Model Rules as states' template for state rules of attorney professional
responsibility).
162 Which most prosecutors do not treat as trumping the more limited rules of disclosure
mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland. See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963).
163 ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 151, at R. 3.8.
164 Id. at 3.8 cmt. 1.
165 Id. at pmbl. 4.
166 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, INSTR. 51-101, JUDGE ADVOCATE ACCESSION PROGRAM
7 (2000).
167 See TJAG POLICY MEMORANDUM TJS-2, AIR FORCE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
AND STANDARDS FOR CIVILITY IN PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3 (2005); see generally TJAG POLICY
MEMORANDUM TJS-2, AIR FORCE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND STANDARDS FOR CIVILITY
IN PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2005); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 27-26, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS (1992); U.S. COAST GUARD, INSTR. M5800.1, COAST GUARD LEGAL
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY PROGRAM (2005); U.S. DEP'T OF NAVY, JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN. INSTR.
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commanders in their convening authority or any other role.168
For example, the U.S. Air Force, similar to its sister services, requires
adherence to the Air Force Rules of Professional Conduct and Standards for
Civility in Professional Conduct which are adapted directly from the above-
discussed ABA Model Rules, and apply to "all lawyers, paralegals and nonlawyer
assistants who practice in Air Force courts or other proceedings . . . includ[ing],
but .. . not limited to, civilian defense counsel (and their associates and non-lawyer
assistants) with no connection to the USAF."l 69 While fashioned after the ABA
Model Rules the Air Force version contains some military-unique modifications.
For example, it changed its version of Rule 3.8 to that governing the special
responsibilities of "trial counsel" instead of those governing prosecutors as stated
in the ABA Model Rules (since prosecutorial authority in the military, as described
above, rests in non-lawyer commanders who are not bound by these rules).o
Notably, even this rule, which speaks directly to the commander exercising
prosecutorial discretion, applies only to lawyers and their assistants and not to the
commanders who need it.
B. Other Standards for Prosecutors
In addition to the states' ethics rules for attorneys (modeled on the ABA
Model Rules), which are binding on federal,' 7' state, and local prosecutors and
include the above-discussed Rule 3.8 for prosecutors, there are specific,
comprehensive standards designed solely for prosecutors, such as the National
District Attorneys Association's National Prosecution Standards [NDAA
Standards]. 72 However, by far the most important standards are those issued by
the ABA, which has promulgated hortatoryl 73 criminal justice standards since the
5803.1D, PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS PRACTICING UNDER THE COGNIZANCE AND
SUPERVISION OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL encl. 1 (2012) [hereinafter JAGINST 5803.1D]
(outlining each service's respective professional standards for attorneys).
168 id
169 See, e.g., AFI 51-201, supra note 110, at 16 (outlining applicability of Air Force ethics and
standards of conduct).
170 See TJAG POLICY MEMORANDUM TJS-2, supra note 167, at 3 (citing source of Air Force
rules and applicability); id. at 16 (outlining the "Special Responsibilities of a Trial Counsel.").
171 States' rules of professional conduct were not always considered binding on federal
prosecutors, though they have been since the McDade Amendment became effective in 1999. See
generally, Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade Amendment, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 2080-97 (2000).
172 See generally DA STANDARDS, supra note 94. This Article does not detail these standards
because they seem largely predicated upon, and duplicative of, the ABA Prosecution Function
Standards and the ABA Model Rules.
17 See generally Podgor, supra note 31 (describing the role of the ABA Criminal Justice
Standards: The Prosecution and Defense Function Standards as serving an internal, advisory role
versus as a basis for disciplinary action).
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late 1960s, including guidelines specifically for prosecutors designed "to be used
as a guide to professional conduct and performance."1 74  While the principles
themselves are non-binding, they are influential, with more than forty states
incorporating at least some of the ABA MODEL RULES into their criminal codes. 75
The ABA MODEL RULES are also widely cited by the Supreme Court, appellate
and state courts, and law review articles when discussing the propriety of
prosecutorial conduct.'76 As noted above in Part II, the drafters of the Discussion
component of the Rules for Courts-Martial utilized the ABA MODEL RULES when
crafting the RCM 306(b) Discussion prosecutorial discretion section.
The ABA Criminal Justice Standards (which cover a huge swath of criminal
justice activity) pertaining to the prosecution function, last updated and published
in 1993, cover a wide ambit of prosecutorial conduct in their Prosecution Function
Standards. 177 The ABA Prosecution Function Standards broadly outline the
prosecutor's function as one of "an administrator of justice, an advocate, and an
officer of the court" who "must exercise sound discretion in the performance of his
or her functions."'78 They stipulate that, "[t]he duty of the prosecutor is to seek
justice, not merely to convict." 79 They further detail recommendations covering
everything from the organization of a prosecutor's office, to investigatory
procedures and relations with victims, to sentencing. 80 The ABA Prosecution
Function Standards provide rules relevant to commanders' military justice roles
such as "[a] prosecutor should avoid unnecessary delay in the disposition of cases.
174 STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION supra note 88, at § 3-1.1.
175 See LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 153, at 50 (citing the ABA Prosecution Function
Standards's incorporation by states and describing their influential role); see generally Work Revising
Criminal Standards Flows From Life in Criminal Law, UNIV. OF CA HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW
(Dec. 13, 2012), available at http://www.uchastings.edu/news/articles/2012/12/criminal-standards-
revised.php [hereinafter Revising Criminal Standards] (describing the Standards as having been cited
over one thousand times in the lower courts and over one hundred times by the Supreme Court).
176 See Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Smith
v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012) (No. 10-8145), 2011 WL 3739380 *4 (discussing the Standards'
weighty import while tracing their history: "[t]he ABA [Prosecution Function] Standards represent a
collection of 'best practices' based on the consensus views of a broad array of professionals involved
in the criminal justice system"); see also Podgor, supra note 31, at 1168-69 (discussing extensive
usage of the ABA Prosecution Function Standards by federal courts and highlighting 2011 legal
search engine search results for the ABA Prosecution Function Standards); Martin Marcus, The
Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: 40 Years of Excellence, 23 CRIM. JUST. (Winter
2009), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal justice section-newsletter/crimjus
t standardsmarcus.authcheckdam.pdf (listing the number of cases citing the standards over 40 years
as almost 1000).
177 The American Bar Association is currently considering the proposed revisions to the
Standards. See generally Revising Criminal Standards, supra note 175 (discussing multi-year
process of revisions as likely not being complete until late 2014).
178 See STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 88, at § 3-1.2.
"s Id. §§ 3-1.1-3-6.2.
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A prosecutor should not fail to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
prosecuting an accused"' 8' as well as the exhortation currently not directly adhered
to in the military. Furthermore:
[w]here practical, the prosecutor should seek to insure that victims of
serious crimes or their representatives are given an opportunity to consult
with and to provide information to the prosecutor prior to the decision
whether or not to prosecute, to pursue a disposition by plea, or to dismiss
the charges.' 82
Particularly relevant for this Article, the ABA Prosecution Function Standards
also outline specific factors to consider regarding the decision to charge an
individual with a criminal offense. 183 As mentioned previously, the Discussion
section of the RCM utilizes several of these factors as considerations for
commanders regarding their disposition decisions, such as the nature of the harm
of the offense and the disproportionate nature of the punishment.184 In addition to
requiring that charges be supported by probable cause, the ABA Prosecution
Function Standards require that a prosecutor possess sufficient admissible evidence
to support a conviction prior to charging. They also require that "[i]n making the
decision to prosecute, the prosecutor should give no weight to the personal or
political advantages or disadvantages which might be involved or to a desire to
enhance his or her record of convictions.',85
Furthermore, the ABA Prosecution Function Standards emphasize the
importance of having a lawyer as the prosecutor, and assume that the charging
decision and the mechanics of criminal prosecution are vested in the same office,
even if not carried out by the same person.' 8 6  They recommend that the
prosecution function be vested in one public official "who is a lawyer subject to
the standards of professional conduct and discipline." 8 7 Specifically:
1' Id. § 3-2.9.
182 The ABA Prosecution Function Standards include a rule dedicated to prosecutors'
responsibilities towards victims. Id § 3-3.2(h).
183 Id. § 3-3.9.
18 See supra Part II.B.1.
185 STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 88, at § 3-3.9(d).
This is a relevant section to highlight the utility of having a commander exercise prosecutorial
discretion instead of a military judge advocate, because commanders are not evaluated on their
military justice roles, whereas judge advocates would face perverse incentives regarding the charging
decision, because they very much are evaluated on their military justice record (they receive
efficiency reports based on the success of their courts-martials and are judged on conviction metrics,
etc.).
186 Id. § 3-1.2(a).
"8 Id. § 3-2.1.
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It is the duty of the prosecutor to know and be guided by the standards of
professional conduct as defined by applicable professional traditions,
ethical codes, and law in the prosecutor's jurisdiction. The prosecutor
should make use of the guidance afforded by an advisory council of the
kind described in standard 4-1.5.'
1. Military Application
In addition to the non-binding RCM 306(b) Discussion's inclusion of several
of the ABA Prosecution Function Standards 3-3.9 factors as non-binding guidance
for commanders, the military services require adherence to several of the ABA
Prosecution Function Standards by their military lawyers (though not
commanders), though this differs among the services.189  Army regulations, for
example,190 specifically state that the ABA Prosecution Function Standards apply
to military attorneys, judges and legal support staff to the extent "they are not
inconsistent with" the UCMJ, MCM, and Army regulations governing military
justice, though the regulations do not specify the inconsistencies.191
The Air Force, in contrast, recently took the step of taking the ABA
Prosecution Function Standards and incorporating them directly, section by
section, into binding Air Force regulations.192 The brand-new Air Force version of
the ABA Prosecution Function Standards are modified to supposedly "meet the
unique needs and demands" of military justice, and like the military's version of
the ABA Model Rules, they are only applicable to lawyers and their staffs, not to
commanders in their prosecutorial and judicial roles. 93 Importantly, the Air Force
omits major sections of the ABA Prosecution Function Standards, such as
standards 3-2.1 through 3-2.5; the Air Force version also omits most of the critical
factors recommended for consideration when making the charging decision, which
are found in ABA Prosecution Function Standard 3.9. These were omitted
because, according to the Air Force, "the convening authority ultimately
determines what charges will be referred and whether to convene a court-martial."
Therefore, the ABA Prosecution Function Standards' factors which guide
"' Id. § 3-1.2(e).
189 Instead of carving out the rules, which specifically apply to the decisions reserved to
commanders, the military services make essentially all the ABA Prosecution Function Standards
regarding prosecution and defense functions binding on its military attorneys, despite the reality that
the military attorneys do not possess the authority to make the decisions which are the subject of
many of those rules.
190 The Navy and Coast Guard make similar use of the ABA Prosecution Function Standards.
See generally U.S. COAST GuARD, INSTR. M5800.1, COAST GUARD LEGAL PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY PROGRAM (June 1, 2005); JAGINST 5803.1D, supra note 167, encl. 1.
'19 AR 27-10, supra note 108, 5-8(c).
192 AFI 51-201, supra note 110, at 288.
193 id
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prosecutorial discretion, are not relevant to military lawyers (except for the
standard requiring probable cause). 194
C. Policy Guidance: DOJ Guidelines
Last, but certainly not least, particularly because the modem military justice
system is designed to approximate the federal criminal justice system as much as
possible, this Article turns to the DoJ [DOJ] for analysis regarding how that
bureaucracy provides decision-making touchstones to guide prosecutorial
discretion. This Article does not claim that the U.S. military should simply adopt
DOJ measures; DOJ focuses on a largely different set of crimes than the military,
such as organized crime and financial crime, whereas the military typically
prosecutes crimes against persons and property, as well as drug offenses and
uniquely military crimes such as absence without leave.195 But DOJ's
comprehensive policy guidelines include detailed ethical standards that provide a
helpful template for developing a code of conduct specifically tailored to the
military.
DOJ provides guidelines for its prosecutors because "it is desirable, in the
interest of the fair and effective administration of justice in the Federal system, that
all Federal prosecutors be guided by a general statement of principles that
summarizes appropriate considerations to be weighed" when making decisions
regarding the initiation of prosecution, entry into plea agreements, and other highly
significant, and discretionary, prosecutorial matters.196  These guiding
considerations are found in the USAM 9-27.000, entitled Principles of Federal
Prosecution [DOJ Principles].' 97 Its rules and policies are designed to help
194 See id at 296, 298-99. One would think that since the commander's ranking military
lawyer (staff judge advocate) typically advises the commander regarding their decision to prosecute,
that said military lawyer should be cognizant of the appropriate factors to consider in such a decision.
Furthermore, the Air Force rationale for not including all the ABA Prosecution Function Standards'
prosecutorial discretion factors is inconsistent with the Air Force's inclusion of Standard 3-3.1(b),
which states that, "[a]n SJA should not invidiously discriminate against or in favor of any person on
the basis of race, religion, sex, sexual preference, or ethnicity in exercising discretion to investigate or
recommend prosecution. An SJA should not use other improper considerations in exercising such
discretion." Why the Air Force adopts this ABA Prosecution Function Standard and not the others
which also deal with prosecutorial discretion is odd and arbitrary.
'9 See Guide to Criminal Prosecutions in the United States, ORG. OF AM. STATES (2007),
available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/usa/enusa-int-desc-guide.html (highlighting the
types of crimes prosecuted by the federal government versus the state, and that the federal
government is better positioned to prosecute "sophisticated and large-scale criminal activity"); see
also Edward T. Pound, Creating a Code of Justice, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 8, 2002,
available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/021216/16justice.b.htm ("Nowadays,
most crimes prosecuted by the military are not military-related-drug use, assault, murder, fraud, and
so on.").
196 See USAM, supra note 21, at § 9-27.110 cmt.
'9 Id. § 9-27.000.
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guarantee "the fair and effective exercise of prosecutorial responsibility by
attorneys for the government," as well as to "promot[e] confidence on the part of
the public and individual defendants that important prosecutorial decisions will be
made rationally and objectively on the merits of each case."' 98  Their stated
purpose is to "promote the reasoned exercise of prosecutorial discretion" among
federal prosecutors.199
While the ABA Prosecution Function Standards, as well as the NDAA
Standards, emphasize the prosecutorial goal of justice,200 the DOJ Principles
elaborate by stressing the concepts of promptness, fairness, and effectiveness. 2 0 1
For example, the DOJ Principles state, "both as a matter of fundamental fairness
and in the interest of the efficient administration of justice, no prosecution should
be initiated against any person unless the government believes that the person
probably will be found guilty by an unbiased trier of fact."2 02 Additionally, the
DOJ Principles repeatedly mention the fundamental purposes of criminal law in
general, citing "assurance of warranted punishment, deterrence of further criminal
conduct, protection of the public from dangerous offenders, and rehabilitation of
offenders . . . that the rights of individuals are scrupulously protected."203
This emphasis on the purposes of criminal law, contrasted with its absence in
the ABA MODEL RULES, reflects the focused purpose of the DOJ Principles: to
guide federal prosecutors in the exercise of their prosecutorial role through a policy
document that allows flexibility, yet provides detailed instruction to prosecutors
working throughout the country to enforce the same laws fairly and consistently.
In that vein, while the DOJ Principles include most of the concepts and rules found
in the ABA Standards, the DOJ Principles outlines them in a different manner.
The USAM provides much greater discussion in several keys areas, such as in its
section regarding appropriate factors to consider when deciding not to prosecute.
Instead of simply listing "nature and seriousness of offense" as an appropriate
factor, 9-27.230's comment section details different ways in which community
impact can be evaluated.204  This habit of detailed explanation is repeated
throughout the DOJ Principles, such as in 9-27.300's twelve-paragraph treatment
19 Id. § 9-27.00 1.
'* Id. § 9-27.110.
200 See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2 (1993). ("The duty
of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict."). See also NAT'LDIST. ArrORNEYS Ass'N,
NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-1.1 (2009) ("The primary responsibility of a prosecutor is to
seek justice ... ).
201 See USAM supra note 21, § 9-27.250 cmt. ("When a person has committed a Federal
offense, it is important that the law respond promptly, fairly, and effectively."). Of course the term
fairness is often synonymous with justice. See, e.g., Fairness Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/fairness (last visited June 12, 2013); Fairness Definition,
THESAURUS.COM, http://thesaurus.com/browse/fairness?s-t (last visited June 12, 2013).
202 USAM,supra note 21, § 9-27.220 cmt.
203 Id. § 9-27.110 cmt.
204 Id. § 9-27.230 cmt.
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of charging the most serious offense. Because the DOJ Principles are geared
specifically toward executive branch officials in the exercise of their prosecutorial
discretion, they are the greatest source of inspiration for the model code of
commander conduct developed in the next Part of this Article who, as executive
branch officials exercising prosecutorial discretion, should be guided by a similar
set of standards.
IV. PROPOSED STANDARDS OF COMMANDER CONDUCT
A. Necessity ofNormative Constraints
Official standards of commander conduct, or a set of ethical rules, are needed
to guide commanders in exercising their military justice function.206 Such decision
rules, consisting of both general principles and more specific instructions, are
necessary to normatively constrain non-lawyer commanders who are accustomed
to formal left and right limits. 2 07  As highlighted in Part II of this Article, little
normative guidance currently exists for commanders to utilize when deciding how
to respond to particular instances of misconduct.208  Furthermore, what little
direction does exist is scattered amongst the RCM, the UCMJ, the MCM, and
service regulations. Given the military's ingrained tradition of memorializing and
consolidating specific direction on how to perform every conceivable task, it is
time to provide better guidance regarding commanders' military justice duties.209
Even the training regarding the dispensation of military justice is inadequate,
205 Id. § 9-27.300.
206 This Article focuses on the convening authority's prosecutorial duties, as opposed to those
more judicial in nature such as approving findings and sentences, because of the probability of
success of proposed legislation in Congress at the time of this writing that will strip convening
authorities of their current Article 60 power to approve and disapprove findings and sentences. See
supra note 6.
207 See supra Part I (discussing necessity and benefits of decision rules).
208 While commanders receive legal advice on most military justice issues, the UCMJ, MCM,
military appellate court decisions, and military regulations repeatedly emphasize that prosecutorial
discretion and other power is vested exclusively in commanders, not their lawyers; therefore, the
commanders with such authority should be bound by appropriate principles regarding its exercise-
guidance which is currently missing in action. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 31 M.J. 572, 591
(N.M.C.M.R. 1990) ("The decision to refer charges to a court-martial, the level of the forum and any
other aspects concomitant with that authority, are functions of the office of convening authority and
matters entirely within the discretion of the convening authority.").
209 A detailed examination of why the U.S. military lacks guidance for commanders regarding
the exercise of their military justice role is beyond the scope of this Article. However, possible
reasons include the fear of running afoul of Article 37's unlawful command influence prohibition, as
well as a feeling that commanders already possess the requisite good judgment to exercise the duties
of their command, including the duty of the military dispensing military justice. However, as noted
in this Article's Introduction, military commanders are typically provided extensive training and
guidance regarding their other duties, which require the exercise of judgment. See supra
Introduction.
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and in stark contrast to the typical military training required for all other military
duties. For example, Army general officers can elect to take a few-hour block on
military justice during the Army's required general officer course, but they are not
required to do so. 2 '0 Furthermore, the short block of elective instruction focuses on
the terse list of factors found in RCM 306(b)'s Discussion, without elaboration.
While all mid-level Army commanders are required to take a "senior officer level
orientation" course, which does include a short block of instruction on military
justice, such instruction merely focuses on RCM 306(b) and the overall
administration of military justice-that is, on form over substance. 211
While detailed prosecutorial policies outlining which offenses to prioritize are
encouraged in the civilian sector,212 such limiting direction is anathema to the
commander-based system in the military that prizes independent commander
213discretion. Therefore, it appears the only permissible way to better educate,
inform, and therefore guide command prosecutorial decisions in the current
military justice construct-particularly regarding the charging and pre-trial
agreement decisionS214-lies in the promulgation of a set of general decision rules
210 Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Devin Winklowsky, Deputy Department
Chair, The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center & School, Charlottesville, VA (June 27, 2013).
211 Id. Lieutenant Colonel Winklowsky explained that the military justice instruction provided
to Army leaders and general officers is based on the non-regulatory, informal guide produced by the
Army's legal school, a product called "Practicing Military Justice." CRIMINAL LAW DEP'T, THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.'s LEGAL CTR & SCH., U.S. ARMY, PRACTICrNG MILITARY JUSTICE (2013). The
current edition of this guide emphasizes in pertinent part that commanders possess a wide range of
available responses to disciplinary incidents, and that prosecutorial discretion rests solely with the
commander, not their military lawyer. See id. at 1-1. Buried deep within this lengthy treatment of
military justice is a brief outline regarding charging geared toward military attorneys rather than
commanders. Id at 7-1. It lists various factors to consider when drafting criminal charges (notably,
commanders do not draft charges, their military lawyers do) and includes arguably inappropriate
guidance such as "[e]rr on the side of liberal charging and be prepared to withdraw as the case
develops." Id. at 7-2. To its credit, this outline lists, as impermissible, selective and vindictive
prosecution, but fails to include most of R.C.M. 306(b)'s factors, and fails to include any type of
discussion regarding the principles a commander should consider when disposing of misconduct. It
only lists three items under what it terms "ethical limitations" to charging: charges must support the
evidence, unreasonable multiplication of charges is prohibited, and no supervising prosecutor can
compel a subordinate attorney to prosecute charges for which the subordinate entertains reasonable
doubt. See id. at 7-2.
212 See STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 88, § 3-2.5(a). ("Each
prosecutor's office should develop a statement of (i) general policies to guide the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion and (ii) procedures of the office. The objectives of these policies as to
discretion and procedures should be to achieve a fair, efficient, and effective enforcement of the
criminal law."); see also DA STANDARDS, supra note 94, § 4-1.2.
213 See supra Part II.B.3 (explaining that detailed policy letters are considered unlawful
command influence and a violation of Article 37). That is, policies stating, for example, that all
Driving Under the Influence offenses will be prosecuted in special courts-martial are prohibited-or
that all service members convicted of sexual assault will receive punitive discharges.
214 While this Article focuses on the prosecutorial roles a convening authority assumes, its
recommended ethical rules are also applicable to what the military appellate courts have termed a
convening authority's judicial functions, such as approving findings and sentences. See United States
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to inform the individual judgment of commanders. These rules, based primarily on
the DOJ Principles and ABA Standards discussed above, as informed by the MCM
and UCMJ, are intended to provide internal guidance to commanders as they
exercise their military justice discretion.215 They are not intended as creating a
litigable right for an accused to use against the Government during courts-
martial.216 However, similar to the DOJ Principles and various state iterations of
the ABA Model Rules, such guidelines can and should theoretically form the basis
for disciplinary action if commanders greatly deviate from their parameters. 2 17
It is particularly apropos that this Article's recommended ethical standards for
commanders draw heavily from the DOJ Principles, given that the MCM is
supposed to track federal practice. As Article 36 stipulates, and the Analysis
explains, "First, the new Manual was to conform to federal practice to the extent
possible, except where the UCMJ requires otherwise or where specific military
requirements render such conformity impracticable." 2 18  Given that federal
prosecutors have prosecutorial guidelines, then military commanders should as
well.2 19 While the DOJ Guidelines have been criticized as ineffective, primarily
due to lack of remedies available for non-compliance,22 o they serve an important
"educative role" 221 and furthermore attempt to strike a balance between "the need
v. Fernandez, 24 M.J. 77, 79 (C.M.A. 1987) (referring to Article 60 role as judicial).
215 See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 88, § 3-3.9 (1993).
216 Unless, of course, the particular rule in question is one which reiterates a separate
constitutional or statutory right, such as the right to be free from selective prosecution based on equal
protection, or the right to be free from unreasonable multiplication of charges. The ethical rule is not
the basis for an accused's complaint; the separate right it reinforces constitutes said basis.
217 Not that commanders are ever disciplined for performance of their military justice roles,
despite this being explicitly called for by Congress in the UCMJ. As discussed supra in Part II.B, the
author was hard pressed to find even one appellate court decision regarding a charged or litigated
Article 98 violation; Article 98 simply is not used in the military justice system to deal with
violations of military justice procedure, despite that being its raison d'etre. Commanders are simply
not held accountable for their prosecutorial decisions.
218 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. introduction to analysis, at A21 - 1.
219 One of the challenges in crafting a list of ethical rules for commanders to utilize in their
military justice role, particularly in their exercise of traditional prosecutorial discretion, is the
artificial distinction the military justice system makes between a prosecuting attorney's duties post-
decision to prosecute, and the decisions it reserves for commanders to 1) prosecute and 2) enter inter
plea-agreements binding on courts. See supra Part IB.1 (describing commanders' prosecutorial
role). For U.S. civilian prosecutors, the prosecutorial-specific rules and guidance discussed above
apply in a complementary fashion with their other ethical obligations as outlined in their respective
state rules, as emphasized in STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 88, § 3-1.2. That
is, the prosecutorial-specific rules assume that other ethical rules apply-which is why this Article's
list of proposed rules include some that are not traditionally considered specific to the prosecutorial
role, such as diligence.
220 See generally Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing
"Discretionary Justice ", 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 167 (2004) (discussing the scant
consequences for failure to comply with the DOJ Guidelines).
221 Podgor, supra note 31, at 1161 (discussing role of DOJ Guidelines).
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in prosecutorial decision-making for certainty, consistency, and an absence of
arbitrariness on the one hand, and the need for flexibility, sensitivity, and
adaptability on the other."222
B. Authority to Issue New Rules
Article 36, recognizes the President's authority223 to prescribe rules regarding
pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures.224 These rules "shall, so far as he considers
practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts, but
which may not be . . . contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter."22 5 Therefore,
if the below proposed standards of conduct are not considered contrary to the
UCMJ's unlawful command influence or any other provision, it appears that the
president may issue them under this Article 36 authority. If inconsistent, though
this Article proposes they are not, then the UCMJ would need to be amended by
Congress to either include the standards outright, or to reconcile the president's
authority to issue them with the contrary provisions.226
Alternatively, if these proposed standards are indeed consistent with the
current UCMJ, as argued above, the President may issue them as rules applicable
to military command eligibility, or "fitness for command," based on his Article 2,
authority as Commander-in-Chief.227 This may be a more logical approach than
basing the recommended standards' issuance on Article 36, which would require
contorting their round contours into the square box of "procedures." 228  The
222 Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19
UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1971) (discussing the reasons requiring such guidelines for prosecutors).
223 The president's authority to issue such rules originally stems from the president's
constitutional role as Commander-in-Chief. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; MCM, supra note 2, at
R.C.M. introduction to analysis A21-1.
224 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (2006).
225 Id
226 Including these recommended standards of conduct as an actual component of the UCMJ is
not recommended because they are meant as a "guide to professional conduct and performance," not
as "judicial evaluation of alleged misconduct" of a commander. See STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION
FUNCTION, supra note 88, § 3-1.1. Given that Article 98 makes it a criminal offense for a commander
to "knowingly and intentionally [fail] to enforce or comply with provisions of the" UCMJ, the Article
does not intend its recommended rules to function as the basis of an Article 98 offense. See generally
10 U.S.C. § 898 (providing a criminal mechanism to punish unnecessary delay in courts-martial
proceedings as well as to punish unlawful command influence and other intentional, bad faith failures
to enforce or comply with the UCMJ).
227 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
228 While this Article's standards are not "procedures" in the same sense as the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure or the Rules for Courts-Martial, the latter already includes the aforementioned
"policy" subsection of R.C.M. 306(b), which includes disposition guidance taken directly from the
second edition of the ABA's Criminal Justice Standards, Prosecution and Defense Function. Therefore,
expanding R.C.M 306(b) into a stand-alone, comprehensive guide of ethical rules is not as much of a
stretch from being characterized as providing a set of "procedures" as it may appear at first blush.
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President may also delegate this authority to the Secretary of Defense, similar to
much of the regulation of the armed forces. However, the promulgation of the
proposed standards should not descend below that of the Secretary of Defense
level, given that uniformity of the rules is necessary (versus individual rules issued
by each service). 22 9  Furthermore, the importance of the rules may be better
demonstrated by high-level dissemination by the President or his Secretary.
C. Proposed Standards of Commander Conduct?30
The following standards,231 compiled from the UCMJ, the MCM, the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the ABA Criminal Justice Standards:
Prosecution and Defense Function, the NDAA Standards, and the USAM, are
recommended as a template of guiding principles and decision rules for
commanders to utilize in their military justice roles. 232  They are intended as
exemplary, non-exclusive principles.233
1) Purpose of Rules234
a) U.S. law reposes unique authority in military commanders to dispose of
misconduct in their units. This authority includes vast, but not unfettered,
discretion. This discretion must be exercised using sound judgment; it is
informed by ethical principles exercised in the fair pursuit ofjustice.
229 See 10 U.S.C. § 836(b) (prescribing uniformity of rules issued by the President).
230 This code is primarily aimed at convening authorities in their exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. But since not all commanders are convening authorities, yet may nonetheless exercise
Article 15 authority to render punishment over their unit service members, the code is applicable to
all commanders. The proposal specifies convening authority where applicable.
231 This Article's proposed list of rules, while individually footnoted, often quote verbatim
from particular sources. While this is noted in the respective footnotes, the actual text does not use
quotations marks to highlight the verbatim portions. These are omitted out of the interest of
providing these rules as a comprehensive set of guidelines, versus simply an amalgamation of
numerous other standards-that is, to avoid the visual and visceral distraction presented by episodic
quotation marks.
232 A comprehensive code of conduct, with explanatory commentary, is beyond the scope of
this Article, given the length such a code necessarily entails, as well as the judgment calls it requires
by current policy makers. Therefore, this Article provides a reasonable template and rationale for
such a code, including what this author considers as its essential components.
233 The author recognizes that the development of such a set of principles can and should be
the focus of an entire article, and plans to engage in that future project. However, the current Article
is well served with these examples in order to demonstrate the types of decision rules advocated for
in Parts I, II, and III.
234 See USAM, supra note 21, § 9-27.110 (2010). See also 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946; MCM,
supra note 2, at R.C.M. 102.
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b) The following principles of command discretion in military justice are
intended to facilitate military commanders' reasoned judgment with
respect to all aspects of military justice, including but not limited to the
disposition of offenses, the approval/disapproval of plea agreements,
approval/disapproval of expert witness requests, and all other court-
martial proceeding exercises of authority such as grants of testimonial
immunity, and approval/disapproval offindings and sentences.
2) Military Justice Objective 23 5
a) The overarching purpose of the military justice system is to promote
justice. Good order and discipline is attained by securing just results.
While it is the commander's duty to maintain good order and discipline,
this duty is not balanced with the pursuit ofjustice; rather, the duty of the
commander is to seek justice first and foremost, and in so doing she will
ensure good order and discipline.236
b) Commanders must make certain that the general purposes of the criminal
law-assurance of warranted punishment, deterrence of further criminal
conduct, protection of the military and the general public from dangerous
offenders, and rehabilitation of offenders-are adequately met, while
making certain also that the rights of individuals are scrupulously
protected.237
235 See generally MCM, supra note 2, Part 1, 1 3 (explaining that the first purpose of military
law is to promote justice). This proposed rule makes clear, whether it holds true already, that justice
takes priority over good order and discipline. While the contours of what constitutes "justice" is
outside the scope of this Article, suffice it to say that it involves doing the right thing and generally
treating like-situated individuals the same way; John Paul Stevens, Two Questions About Justice,
2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 821, 826-27 (2003) (discussing the types of justice advanced in Plato's
Republic, and concluding that justice may simply be explained similarly to Justice Potter Stewart's
explanation of pornography-that is, you know it when you see it.).
236 See STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 88, § 3-1.2 ("The duty of the
prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict."). See also USAM, supra note 21, § 9-27.110
cmt. (It is "in the interest of the fair and effective administration ofjustice in the Federal system, that
all Federal prosecutors be guided by a general statement of principles . . . ."); Nedra Pickler, US.
Attorneys Told to Expect Scrutiny, BOsTON.COM (Apr. 9, 2009),
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2009/04/09/us attorneys_told toexpect-sc
rutiny ("'Your job as assistant US attorneys is not to convict people,' [U.S. Attorney General Eric]
Holder said. 'Yourjob is not to win cases. Yourjob is to do justice. Yourjob is in every case, every
decision that you make, to do the right thing."').
237 See generally USAM, supra note 21, § 9-27.110 cmt.
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3) Competence2 38
a) When selecting individual service members for command, consideration
should be given to "age, education, training, experience, length of service,
and judicial temperament. "239 A commander should be an individual who
exhibits sound judgment regarding fellow and subordinate service members.
b) The commander must exercise sound discretion in the performance of his or
her duties.240
4) Diligence24 1
A commander shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in dealing with
misconduct and with specific charges.
5) Fairness
A commander should not invidiously discriminate against or in favor of any person
on the basis of race, religion, sex, sexual preference, ethnicity, rank, source of
commission, prior military record, or professional affiliation in exercising
discretion to investigate, discipline, or prosecute. A commander should not use
other improper considerations in exercising such discretion.242
Persons who commit similar crimes and have similar culpability should, to the
extent possible, be treated similarly.243
238 See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. (2013).
239 See 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (2006) (describing the attributes of court-martial panel
members).
240 See STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 88, § 3-1.2(b).
241 See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2013); see also MCM, supra note
2, at R.C.M. 306(b) ("Allegations of offenses should be disposed of in a timely manner."); Id. at
R.C.M. 306(c) discussion ("Prompt disposition of charges is essential.").
242 See STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 88, § 3-3.1(b) (differing by use of
commander instead of prosecutor, and by addition of the factor of rank as an impermissible
consideration, as well as addition of function of discipline). See also USAM, supra note 21, § 9-
27.260. Military rank can and should be used when determining appropriate discipline, including
whether to prosecute, based on the significance rank has as to level of culpability and responsibility
(the higher the rank, the greater the responsibility and commensurate accountability). Regarding this
standard of fairness, rank should not be "invidiously" used, for example, to treat lower ranking
individuals wore severely than higher-ranking ones out of an unjust sense of preference for higher
rank.
243 See Memorandum from Office of the Attorney General on Department Policy on Charging
and Sentencing to All Federal Prosecutors (May, 19 2010) [hereinafter Holder Memo].
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6) Standard for Referral of Charges
a) A commander should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or permit the
continued pendency of criminal charges when the commander knows that the
charges are not supported by probable cause. Furthermore, a commander
should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of
criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support a
conviction. 244
b) The commander is not obliged to prefer or refer all charges supported by the
evidence. 245
7) Grounds for Referring or Declining to Refer ChargeS246
The convening authority should refer charges if he or she believes that the
person's conduct constitutes a UCMJ offense and that the admissible evidence will
probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, unless, in his or her
judgment, prosecution should be declined because:
1. No substantial military or criminal justice interest, such as good order
and discipline, deterrence, punishment, rehabilitation, or public safety,
would be served by prosecution;247
2. The person is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or
3. The interests of justice and good order and discipline will be better
served by an alternate disposition.
8) Permissible Disposition Consideration Factors
a) Illustrative of the factors which the commander may properly consider in
exercising his or her discretion to refer charges or respond with non-
criminal disciplinary measures are:
i. the commander's reasonable doubt that the accused is in
fact guilty;
244 See STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 88, § 3-3.9(a). The ABA
Prosecution Function Standard of sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction, is a higher
one than simply of probable cause. If such evidence is lacking, the convening authority should not
refer charges, regardless of the intent (such as for deterrence purposes or to pursue a plea).
"[P]rosecution entails profound consequences for the accused and the family of the accused whether
or not a conviction ultimately results." See generally USAM,supra note 21, § 9-27.001.
245 See STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 88, § 3-3.9(b).
246 USAM, supra note 21, § 9-27.220.
247 See Holder Memo, supra note 243 ("Charging decisions should be informed by reason and
by the general purposes of criminal law enforcement: punishment, public safety, deterrence, and
rehabilitation.").
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ii. the nature of and circumstances surrounding the offense and
the extent of the harm caused by the offense, including the
offense's effect on military morale, health, safety, welfare,
and discipline;
iii. the disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to
the particular offense or the offender;
iv. possible improper motives ofa complainant;
v. reluctance of the victim to testify;248
vi. views of the victim regarding disposition;
vii. cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or
conviction of others;
viii. availability and likelihood of prosecution by another
jurisdiction;
ix. existence ofjurisdiction over the accused and the offense;
x. Character and military service record of the accused,
particularly any history ofprevious misconduct.249
b) A commander shall not be compelled by his or her superior commanders
to prosecute a case in which he or she has a reasonable doubt about the
guilt of the accused.
c) In making the decision to prosecute, the commander should give no weight
to the personal or career advantages or disadvantages that might resultfrom disposition of the case, or a desire to enhance his or her record of
convictions.
d) In cases involving a serious threat to the community, the commander
should not be deterred from prosecution by the fact that military panels
have tended to acquit persons accused of the particular kind of UCMJ
violation in question.
248 Current Department of Defense sexual assault regulations provide that commanders, in
sexual assault cases, should "honor" victims' decisions regarding whether to prosecute. See DODI
6495.02, supra note 115, at 26.
249 See STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 88, § 3-3.9(b)(i-vii). Factors ii, ix
and x are found in the current R.C.M. 306(b) discussion. MCM, supra note 2, at R.C.M. 306(b)
discussion. Factor ii elaborates upon the ABA Prosecution Function Standard of "extent of harm
caused by the offense." STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 88, § 3-3.39(b)(ii).
Factor x, character and military service of the accused, serve much the same purpose as DOJ
Guideline's § 9-27.230's factor A.5, "The person's history with respect to criminal activity." USAM,
supra note 21, § 9-27.230. For example, if the accused has a history of similar offenses, referral to
court-martial may be more appropriate than someone with a clean conduct history. However, a
terrific service record should not be a reason to dispose of a serious offense through non-criminal
measures; the military's interest in deterrence (directly correlated with good order and discipline) as
well as criminal law's goals of punishment, public safety, and rehabilitation, must also be balanced.
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9) Impermissible Disposition Consideration Factors250
In determining whether and what kind of disciplinary action to take against a
particular service member, a commander should not be influenced by:
1. The service member's race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, national
origin, or political association, activities or beliefs;
2. The commander's own personal feelings concerning the service
member, the service member's associates, or the victim;
3. The possible affect of the decision on the commander's own
professional or personal circumstances, or that of any subordinate in
the commander's unit ;or
4. The service member's combat record.2 5
10) Unlawful Command Influence
a) A convening authority shall not, while a proceeding is pending or
impending in any court, make any public comment that might reasonably
be expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness or make any
nonpublic comment that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or
hearing. 252
b) Commanders may not censure, reprimand, or admonish the court or any
member, military judge, or counsel thereof with respect to the findings or
sentence adjudged by the court, or with respect to any other exercises of
its or his functions in the conduct of the proceedings.253
250 While these considerations are drawn from DOJ Manual 9-27.260 Initiating and Declining
Charges-Impermissible Considerations, as well as from constitutional case law as discussed in Part
II.B.3.iii, they are progressive in that they include sexual orientation as an impermissible factor for
consideration. See USAM, supra note 21, § 9-27.260; Sources cited supra Part III.C. They are
redundant with Rule 5 except for the factor of rank, which should be a factor when charging (for
example, a senior non-commissioned officer's position of trust and responsibility exacerbates what
may be a lesser infraction for a junior enlisted person) but should not be used as a basis for invidious
discrimination in general.
251 This directly contradicts the current practice, which, as exemplified by the existing Air
Force formal guidance, encourages commanders to pursue lesser disciplinary action based on an
accused's good combat record. See AFI 51-201, supra note 110, at 154 ("Convening authorities
should consider an accused's service in an area of combat operations in determining what
punishment, if any, to approve. Where the sentence of an accused with an outstanding record in an
area of combat operations extends to a punitive discharge, convening authorities should consider
suspending or remitting the discharge, provided that return to duty is in the best interests of the Air
Force.").
252 Id. at 375 (Air Force Uniform Code of Judicial Conduct 3B(9)); STANDARDS FOR
PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 88, § 3-1.4(a).
253 10 U.S.C. § 837(a) (2006).
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c) No commander may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized means,
influence the action of a court-martial or any other military tribunal or
any member thereof in reaching the findings or sentence in any case, or
the action of any convening, approving, or reviewing authority with
respect to his judicial acts.254
d) A commander should not discourage or obstruct communication
between prospective witnesses and defense counsel. A commander
should not advise any person or cause any person to be advised to
decline to give to the defense information which such person has the
right to give.255
11) Unreasonable Multiplication of Charge 256
a) Convening authorities will not refer charges greater in number of degree
than can reasonably be supported with evidence at trial or than are
necessary to fairly reflect the gravity of the offense.
b) The charges should fairly represent the defendant's criminal conduct.257
12) Relations With Victims and Prospective Witnesse 258
a) Where practical, the convening authority should seek to insure that victims
of serious crimes or their representatives are given an opportunity to
consult with and to provide information to the convening authority or the
convening authority's Staff Judge Advocate prior to the decision whether
or not to prosecute, to pursue a disposition by plea, or to dismiss the
charges.
b) The convening authority should ensure that victims and witnesses who
request information about the status of cases in which they are interested
are promptly provided said information.
c) The convening authority as well as subordinate commanders should seek
to insure that victims and witnesses who may need protections against
intimidation are advised of and afforded protections where feasible.
254 id
255 STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 88, § 3-3.1(d).
256 MCM, supra note 2, at R.C.M. 307. See cases cited supra Part II.B.3.
257 Holder Memo, supra note 243.
258 This recommended ethical rule is taken almost verbatim. STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION
FUNCTION, supra note 88, § 3-3.2.
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13) Fulfillment of Plea Agreements259
A commander should not fail to comply with a plea agreement, unless a
defendant fails to comply with a plea agreement or other extenuating
circumstances are present.
14) Justification of Decisions
a) A commander, when contravening the advice of his or her Staff Judge
Advocate regarding either the referral of charges to a court-martial or
regarding the Article 60 decision to approve sentence and findings, must
articulate the justification for such departure from legal advice in writing,
and transmit said justification to his or her commander, as well as to the
service The Judge Advocate General's representative.
b) While the superior commander is not authorized to direct the subordinate
commander to alter their decision, the superior commander should take
these stated departures from legal advice into consideration when deciding
whether to withhold subordinate authority to take action in future such
cases.
CONCLUSION
The modem U.S. military justice system is one operated by ethical-that is,
rule-abiding-professionals who dedicate their lives in service of their nation.
Commanders are this system's disciplinary fulcrum, and as such are vested with
vast criminal prosecutorial powers. However, there is a jarring disconnect between
commanders' vital prosecutorial role and their martial functions. While as
warriors they are well-served by detailed statutory and regulatory guidance
regarding combat duties-guidance drilled into them through extensive training-
they are under-served in the military justice realm, which provides scant direction
as to when and how to exercise command disciplinary and criminal authority. Not
only does this stand in stark contrast to the highly-regulated exercise of command
martial duties, it also differs from the numerous ethical guidelines imposed on
civilian prosecutors in the federal and state criminal justice systems. Such decision
rules in the civilian criminal justice arena attempt to facilitate consistent and just
results not by removing prosecutorial discretion, but by infusing such discretion
with decisional touchstones.
It is time to remedy the disparity between the civilian and military
prosecutorial realms and between the military's own martial and disciplinary
arenas, by filling the military justice decisional vacuum with dispositional rules.
259 Id. § 3-4.2(c).
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While some may argue that commanders already receive decisional guidance from
their military lawyers, thereby obviating the need for a comprehensive set of rules
designed to guide command discretion, this argument breaks apart upon the shores
of reality. In the majority of cases, the law does not require that military lawyers
provide dispositional advice to commanders regarding when and how to discipline
and prosecute, with sexual assault being a recent exception.260 Even assuming
arguendo that military lawyers always do provide such guidance, such advice is
necessarily arbitrary, given the current paucity of articulated standards regarding
how disciplinary cases are to be handled in the military, and even in those
standards already applicable to military lawyers. And at the end of the day,
military lawyers are not the ones vested by law with the power to prosecute and
discipline-commanders are. And unfortunately, thoughtful, normative, and
transparent guidance governing how to exercise that discretion is currently missing
in action.
Military commanders, as well as the accused and victims who trust the system
to serve justice, deserve appropriate decision rules to guide prosecutorial decision-
making. Such decision rules, exemplified by this Article's proposed code of
conduct, include moral content as well as legal imperatives, and facilitate just,
consistent, and even-handed results. They are not based on artificial, highly-
legalistic concepts, but rather on fundamental principles of fairness. Given this
seemingly basic foundation, one may argue that commanders already implicitly
know how and when to dispose of misconduct in their units, and hence need no
governing rules. But just as targeting the enemy on the battlefield is not
undertaken without recourse first to overarching principles of warfare, neither
should prosecuting a subordinate, or choosing not to prosecute despite strong
evidence, be pursued without reference first to transparent governing guidelines.
Even hortatory, aspirational principles are value-added in a military culture which
functions on strict adherence to rules, and one that inculcates the expectation that
rules exist to guide all areas of decision-making.
This Article's proposed decision rules are offered in service to military
commanders' wide discretion, acting to shape, not remove, such authority.
Without them, the status quo-well-intentioned but normatively unguided and
legally-uneducated military officers making prosecutorial decisions just as weighty
as those made on the battlefield, but without similar normative investment-will
260 Of course, as noted supra Part II.B. 1, convening authorities are required to receive pre-trial
advice from their staff judge advocate that probable cause exists prior to referring charges to court-
martial in general courts-martial. Such advice is not required for referral to a special or summary
court-martial. Even with such a finding of probable cause, the commander is not required to refer
charges, and no other pre-referral advice is required from their military lawyer to help them make this
difficult decision. Hence this attorney-provided imprimatur (that probable cause exists prior to
charges being referred to a general court-martial) is a far cry from the comprehensive set of
dispositional decision standards that this Article recommends.
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continue to erode the perception, and sometimes the reality, of justice in military
justice.261
261 "We don't let commanders practice medicine. So why do we let them practice law?"
Interview with Colonel Raymond A. Jackson, U.S. Army Judge Advocate (July 4, 2013) [notes on
file with author].
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